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INTRODUCTION
An infusion pump at a hospital lost its battery 
charge and was
plugged into a wall outlet to ensure continued 
operation. But when
plugged in, the infusion rate switched from 
71 mL/hr to 500 mL/hr!
1
Such an increase could easily cause fatal 
overdose in a patient. To
prevent this defect, the pump software was revised 
to include a default
set at zero for rate and volume settings as 
well as the inclusion of a
"check settings" alarm.
2
People from around the world were able 
to peer into the girl's
locker room at Livingstone Middle School.
3 The school had installed
Axis cameras as a security measure. What 
they didn't do was change
the default password on the cameras. Because the 
default password,
"pass," is well known, anyone could view the images. This could have
been prevented if every camera had a unique 
password or forced each
user to change the password during setup. 
Instead, the manufacturer
knowingly opted to do nothing.
4
1 Adverse Event Report, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 
Abbott Laboratories Lifecare
Infusion Plum XL Pump infusion Pump (Oct. 1, 1999), http://www.accessdata.fda.
gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfMAUDE/DetailCFM?MDRFOI-ID=251892' 
There are
numerous examples like this in the FDA's Manufacturer 
and User Facility Device Ex-
perience Database, http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/maude.html.
2 Adverse Event Report, supra note 1.
3 Patrick Di Justo, On the Net, Unseen Eyes, N.Y. 
TIMEs, Feb. 24, 2005, at Gi (writ-
ing about a lawsuit filed by students who had visited 
Livingston Middle School).
4 Id.
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Over two-thirds of the people who use computers were con-
cerned with cyber-security in 2000.5 Two of the four bestselling
software titles in 2003 were system utilities and security products. 6 You
would expect that the informed and motivated individuals who
bought these products would have secure computer systems. How-
ever, in-home studies of computers have found considerable security
deficiencies. The most recent study conducted in December 2005
found that eighty-one percent of home computers lacked core secur-
ity protections, such as recently updated anti-virus software, properly
configured firewall and/or spyware protection. 7 The explanation for
this discrepancy between people's security concerns and their com-
puter's common security defects is best explained by users' inability to
properly configure security software despite their best efforts.
In each of these three examples, default settings play a crucial
role in how people use computers. Default settings are pre-selected
options chosen by the manufacturer or the software developer. The
software adopts these default settings unless the user affirmatively
chooses an alternative option. Defaults push users toward certain
choices. This Article examines the role of software defaults and pro-
vides recommendations for how defaults should be set. Our hope is
that proper guidance will ensure that manufacturers and developers
set defaults properly, so as to avoid the kind of problems encountered
with the infusion pump or the security camera, while also making it
easier for users to properly configure their computers to vindicate
their security or privacy preferences.
This Article takes off from the recognition by scholars that
software has the ability to affect fundamental social concerns, such as
5 Press Release, Info. Tech. Ass'n of Am., New Nationwide Poll Shows Two-
Thirds of Americans Worry About Cybercrime; Online Criminals Seen as Less Likely
To Be Caught (June 19, 2000), http://www.itaa.org/infosec/release.cfm?ID=285.
6 Press Release, NPD Techworld, NPD Group Reports Overall Decrease in PC
Software Sales for 2003: Demand for Tax and Security Software Helps Negate Dwin-
dling Sales in Education and Games (Feb. 5, 2004), http://www.npdtechworld.com/
techServlet?nextpage=PR body_i t. h tml&con ten tid=720.
This trend has not changed. Three of the five top-selling PC software products
were security related, and more than half of the top twenty PC software products were
security related in September 2005. Press Release, NPD Techworld, Top-Selling PC
Software: September 2005 (Oct. 19, 2005), http://www.npdtechworld.com/techSer-
vlet?nextpage=PR.bodyjt.html&con tent id=2238 [hereinafter NPD, Top-Selling).
7 AM. ONLINE & NAT'L CYBER SEC. ALLIANCE, AOL/NCSA ONLINE SAFETY STUDY 2
(2005), available at http://www.staysafeonine.info/pdf/safety study-2005.pdf [here-
inafter ONLINE SAFETY STUDY].
2006]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
privacy and free speech.8 Scholars and software developers equally
recognize that it is possible to proactively design software to address
issues such as crime, 9 competition,' 0 free speech,"1 privacy, 12 fair use
in copyright,' 3 and democratic discourse. 14 This approach relies on
the ability of policymakers to manipulate (or create an environment
to manipulate) software settings. In other words, software possesses
characteristics that can be relied upon to govern. We have high-
lighted several of these governance characteristics of software, 15 which
are analogous to "knobs and levers" that policymakers can manipulate
to favor specific values or preferences. Just as policymakers influence
behavior by manipulating incentives and penalties through subsidies
and fines, they can also influence user behavior by manipulating the
8 See STUART BIEGEL, BEYOND OUR CONTROL? 187-211 (2001) (discussing
software-based regulation); LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE
24-29 (1999) (describing the role of architecture); MichaelJ. Madison, Law as Design:
Objects, Concepts, and Digital Things, 56 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 381, 414-19, 425-30,
440-47, 463-75 (providing a sophisticated account of the role of materiality as it re-
lates to software regulation); Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of
Information Policy Rules Through Technology, 76 TEx. L. REv. 553, 557-58 (1998); see also
Sandra Braman, The Long View, in COMMUNICATION RESEARCHERS AND POLICY-MAKING
11 (Sandra Braman ed., 2003) (urging communications scholars to study how tech-
nology affects fundamental societal issues).
9 See, e.g., Neal Kumar Katyal, Criminal Law in Cyberspace, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 1003,
1102-06 (2001).
10 See, e.g., Mark N. Cooper, Anticompetitive Problems of Closed Communications Facili-
ties, in OPEN ARCHITECTURE As COMMUNICATIONS POLICY 155, 161 (Mark N. Cooper
ed., 2004), available at http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blogs/cooper/archives/openar-
chitecture.pdf.
11 See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig & Paul Resnick, Zoning Speech on the Internet: A Legal
and Technical Model, 98 MlCH. L. REV. 395, 399 (1999);Jonathan Weinberg, Rating the
Net, 19 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 453, 456-59 (1997).
12 See, e.g., William McGeveran, Programmed Privacy Promises: P3P and Web Privacy
Law, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1812, 1826-27 (2001) (arguing for the Preferences for Privacy
Project (P3P) as a solution to privacy problems).
13 See, e.g., TARLETON GILLESPIE, WIRED SHUT (forthcoming Spring 2007) (analyz-
ing the role of digital rights management software); Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen,
Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights Management Systems, 15 HAiRY. J.L. & TECH 41, 47-54
(2001) (providing an example of an architectural solution to allow fair use in digital-
based intellectual property).
14 See, e.g., ANTHONY G. WILHELM, DEMOCRACY IN THE DIGITAL AGE 44-47 (2000)
(discussing how to design a democratic future); Cathy Bryan et al., Electronic Democracy
and the Civic Networking Movement in Context, in CYIERDEMOCRAGY 1, 6-8 (Roza Tsa-
garousianou et al. eds., 1998) (providing a number of examples for using electronic
resources for stimulating democratic discussion and growth).
15 Rajiv C. Shah & Jay P. Kesan, Manipulating the Governance Characteristics of Code,
INFO, Aug. 2003, at 5-8.
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design of softwarei 6 This Article continues this line of inquiry by fo-
cusing on the role that default settings play in software development
and use.
Default settings appear in a variety of contexts; for example, in
Preferred Placement,17 several authors explore how default settings for
privacy,18 portals, 19 and search engines20 affect how people use the
Web. As an example, consider that the most valuable part of Netscape
was not its software, but its default setting for its home page. Because
a large number of users (estimated at forty percent) never changed
this default setting, Netscape's home page had enormous popular-
ity.21 Analysts touted the importance of this default home page (a top
ten Website at the time) when AOL purchased Netscape for about
four billion dollars. 22 The economic significance of this default set-
ting highlights the power of defaults. Defaults play an important role
in virtually every important decision users make online. These deci-
sions have ramifications in areas such as privacy and security and in-
volve software in diverse products such as Web browsers, operating
systems, and wireless access points.
Default settings are not a creation of the Internet. Legal scholars
and behavioral economists have long studied the role of default set-
tings, albeit not software defaults.23 Research by behavioral econo-
mists has studied the deference to defaults in decisions regarding
16 See Dan L. Burk, Legal and Technical Standards in Digital Rights Management Tech-
nology, 74 FoRDHAm L. REv. 537, 546-47 (2005) (discussing the use of design-based
software regulation).
17 PREFERRED PLACEMENT (Richard Rogers, ed., 2000).
18 Greg Elmer, The politics of Profiling, in PREFERRED PLACEMENT, supra note 17, at
65, 69-72 (discussing privacy concerns raised by internet browsers' activation of cook-
ies without informing internet users).
19 Richard Rogers and Ian Morris, Operating the Internet with Socio-Epistemological
Logics, in PREFERRED PLACEMENT, supra note 17, at 145, 149-55 (discussing corpora-
tions' agreements with web portals-such as America Online in an effort to gain in-
creased exposure by having links to their content placed on Websites to which users
are automatically directed).
20 Lucas Introna and Helen Nissenbaum, The Public Good Vision of the Internet and
the Politics of Search Engines, in PRrERED PLACEMENT, supra note 17, at 25, 31-37 (dis-
cussing the process by which search engines rank Websites in their search results and
the increased traffic experienced by Websites with a high ranking).
21 LORRIE FAITH CRANOR & REBECCA N. WRIGHT, INFLUENCING SOFTWARE USAGE 6
(1998), http://xx.lanl.gov/PScache/cs/pdf/9809/9809018.pdf (citing the 40% es-
timate in their discussion of software defaults).
22 Douglas Herbert, Netscape in Talks with AOL, CNNMoNE.coM, Nov. 23, 1998,
http://money.cnn.com/1998/11/23/deals/netscape/.
23 See infra Part I.A.
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organ donation and investment saving plans.2 4 Their work explains
the systematic differences that occur between opt-in and opt-out de-
fault plans. Their explanations for the power of defaults focus on
bounded rationality, cognitive limitations, and the legitimating ef-
fect. 25 These biases are also important for understanding how
software defaults operate.
Legal scholarship is another arena that provides a useful analogy
for understanding software defaults. For example, the Uniform Com-
mercial Code contains a variety of default rules, such as the implied
warranty of merchantability, which apply absent contrary agreement
by the parties.26 Legal scholars have wrestled with questions about
what rules should be default rules versus mandatory rules. Contract
scholars have focused on the role of consent. Consent is relevant to
defaults, since policymakers need to consider whether the parties have
freely consented to these defaults or whether they were coerced into
accepting the default settings.
At first brush, default settings in software appear to be solely a
concern for computer scientists. Computer scientists within Human-
Computer Interaction (HCI) have written about how software defaults
should be set.27 However, their approach is almost entirely technical.
It focuses on enhancing the performance of software and the effi-
ciency of users. While HCI considers the limitations of users, it lacks a
framework for setting defaults for humanistic or societal issues, such
as privacy.
Ultimately, we rely on the combination of the three approaches
of computer science, behavioral economics, and legal scholarship to
provide key insights into understanding how defaults operate. This
understanding leads us to focus on how society can harness default
settings in software to enhance societal welfare. Sunstein and Thaler
have coined the term "libertarian paternalism" to refer to the use of
default settings as a method of social regulation.28 To enable the
proactive use of defaults, we offer a general rule for setting defaults in
software as well as identifying several circumstances when policymak-
ers should intervene and change default settings. To illustrate this
process we have developed several flowcharts that highlight the deci-
sionmaking process. This normative analysis regarding software set-
tings is unique. Many scholars have recognized the power of software,
24 See infra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
25 See infra Part III.B.
26 U.C.C. § 2-314 (2006).
27 CRANOR & WRIGRT, supra note 21, at 6-7.
28 Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymo-
ron, 70 U. CI. L. REv. 1159, 1171 (2003).
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however there is little scholarship that focuses on how software set-
tings should be determined by employing a generalized framework
for analysis.
The Article is organized as follows. Part I reviews empirical data
on the effectiveness of defaults. This research substantiates the impor-
tance and power of defaults. Part II considers a variety of previously
mentioned theoretical approaches for understanding default settings.
The second part ends by illustrating the limitations of these four ap-
proaches by' applying them to three controversial uses of software de-
faults in the areas of competition, privacy, and security. Part III
focuses on how defaults should be set. Part of this normative discus-
sion urges that defaults are currently set incorrectly for two technolo-
gies (Internet cookies and wireless security encryption) that affect
security and privacy. Finally, Part IV discusses how government could
influence default settings in software. We do not attempt to catalog
all the possible actions by government, but instead show that govern-
ment is not powerless in dealing with defaults.
Our efforts are aimed at explaining how defaults operate in
software and how policymakers should set software defaults. We use
the term "policymaker" throughout this Article as a catch-all defini-
tion for a wide range of individuals including software developers, ex-
ecutives, policy activists, and scholars who are concerned with the
implications of software regulation. After all, there are many parties
that are interested in and capable of modifying software.
I. THE POWER OF DEFAULTS
This Part reviews research on the power of defaults to influence
behavior in a variety of contexts. While it is possible for people to
change a default setting, there are many situations where they defer to
the default setting. This Part shows the impact of their deference to
the default setting, not only on the individual, but also on norms and
our culture.
Subpart A reviews several academic studies in the context of
401 (k) plans, organ donation, and opt-in versus opt-out checkboxes.
Subpart B then turns its attention to the power of defaults in software.
Our discussion of software provides examples of how defaults affect
competition, privacy, and security. These examples illustrate the
power of defaults in computer software to influence behavior and are
referenced throughout our later discussions on understanding de-
faults and how best to set them. Subpart C illustrates the wide-ranging
effects of defaults in software with an example of a file-sharing
2oo6]
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software. Finally, subpart D considers how defaults affect society's
norms and the creation of culture.
A. Research on the Power of Defaults
This subpart reviews three studies that reveal the power of de-
faults in influencing behavior. In the first study, Madrian and Shea
examine the saving behavior of individuals enrolled in a 401 (k) sav-
ings plan. 29 Initially, the human resources policy default was set so
that employees were not automatically enrolled in a 401(k) savings
plan. 30 The employer later changed this setting, so that the new de-
fault setting automatically enrolled employees. In both circum-
stances, employees were free to join or leave the program.3 1
Contributions ranged from 1% to 15% by the employee with the em-
ployer matching 50% of employee contributions up to 6% of em-
ployee compensation.32 The only material difference was the change
in the default setting and a default value of 3% employee contribution
in the automatic savings plan.33 This switch in default settings re-
suited in an increase in participation in the 401 (k) savings plan from
37% to 86%!34 Clearly, the default was significant.
A second example that illustrates the power of defaults is organ
donation defaults. Countries have two general approaches to organ
donation-either a person is presumed to have consented to organ
donation or a person must explicitly consent to donation.3 5 Johnson
and Goldstein analyzed the role of default settings by looking at cadav-
eric donations in several countries.36 They found that the default had
a strong effect on donations. When donation is the default, there is a
16% increase in donation. 37 Their work shows the power of defaults
to influence behavior and how default settings can save lives in certain
circumstances (in this case by increasing organ donations).
Bellman, Johnson, and Lohse examined the role of default set-
tings in online checkboxes for opting-in or opting-out of certain prac-
29 Brigitte C. Madrian & Dennis F. Shea, The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k)
Participation and Savings Behavior, 116 Q.J. ECON. 1149, 1151 (2001).
30 Id. at 1151.
31 Id. at 1152.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 1160.
35 EricJ.Johnson & Daniel Goldstein, Do Defaults Save Lives , 302 Sci. 1338, 1338
(2003).
36 Id.
37 Id. at 1339.
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0")
tices.38 These checkboxes are typically used for 
privacy settings, junk
e-mail settings, and a variety of other simple 
questions in online
forms. 9 In this experiment, participants were 
asked in an online
form whether or not to be notified about future 
surveys. Participants
had to choose between "yes" and "no." When 
the default was set to
"no," only 60% of the participants agreed to be notified later.
40 But
when the default was set to "yes," 89% of the participants 
agreed to be
notified later.A' This difference is quite pronounced 
and shows how
people may defer to a default.
B. The Role of Defaults in Software
A default in software is analogous to the defaults 
described above.
A definition for a software default is a pre-selected 
option adopted by
the software when no alternative is specified by 
the user. Defaults only
refer to functions that can be changed by the 
user. A setting that the
user is unable to change is a fixed aspect of 
the system ("wired in")
and is therefore not a default. Developers 
often use "wired-in" set-
tings for aspects of software that users do not 
need to modify.42 The
degree to which software can be modified can 
be seen along the con-
tinuum in Figure 1.43
FIGURE 1. CONTINUUM OF SETTINGS
Fixed settings- Default Settings- 
Fully Customizable
"wired-in" "pushing the user" 
"free choice"
The malleability of software means that developers 
can add, re-
move, or change default settings. A typical program 
has tens (and up
to hundreds) of defaults that are set by the developer. These 
defaults
may also change over time as developers revise 
their software. These
defaults may be default values, which refer to 
strings, numbers, or bits
that are held in a particular field for input screens 
or forms. Other
defaults include default settings, which are 
values, options, and
choices that are stored and referenced by an 
application. Finally, de-
38 Steve Bellman et al., To Opt-In or Opt-Out? 
It Depends on the Question, CoMM.
ACM, Feb. 2001, at 25, 25.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 26.
41 Id.
42 See Burk, supra note 16, at 546-51 (discussing the 
use of embedded rules in
software).
43 As Greg Vetter has pointed out to us, our analysis 
is user-centric. From a devel-
oper's perspective, there are additional layers 
of modifiable settings that may appear
to the user as wired in.
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fault actions are courses of actions that are presented to a user interac-
tively. These defaults often come in the form of alert or confirmation
boxes. In this Article, we use the term default or default settings to
refer to all three meanings of defaults in software.
The first example for illustrating the power of defaults in software
concerns desktop icons on Microsoft Windows operating systems. The
issue of which desktop icons to include in a computer's operating sys-
tem was prominent in the mid-1990s when Microsoft was attempting
to catchup to Netscape's Web-browsing software use. Microsoft's in-
ternal research found that "consumers tend strongly to use whatever
browsing software is placed most readily at their disposal, and that
once they have acquired, found, and used one browser product, most
are reluctant-and indeed have little reason-to expend the effort to
switch to another."44 In effect, Microsoft recognized that the initial
default for Web browsers is crucial for attracting and retaining
consumers.
This led to a policy where Microsoft threatened to terminate the
Windows license from computer manufacturers that removed
Microsoft's chosen default icons, such as Internet Explorer, from the
Windows desktop. 4 5 In one instance, Microsoft threatened Compaq
after Compaq entered into a marketing agreement with AOL. Com-
paq had agreed to place AOL's icon and no other online service
icons, such as Internet Explorer, on the desktop of PCs. 46 Microsoft
then threatened to terminate Compaq's licenses for Windows 95 if its
icons were not restored.4 7 At the time, Compaq was the highest-vol-
ume original equipment manufacturer (OEM) partner that Microsoft
had.48 Nevertheless, Compaq acquiesced and restored the Internet
Explorer icon as a default desktop setting.49
Clearly default settings were important for Microsoft and AOL.
While we do not know what the value of the setting was to Microsoft or
Compaq, we have an idea of how valuable it was to AOL. A few years
later, AOL was still pushing manufacturers to add default icons and
pop-up ads promoting AOL. AOL was offering manufacturers thirty-
44 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 47 (D.D.C. 1999).
45 id. at 59.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 60.
48 Id.
49 Compaq's behavior led Microsoft to clarify in its contracts with manufacturers
that it prohibited changes to the default icons, folders, or "Start" menu entries. Id. at
61.
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five dollars for each customer that signed up with AOL.
50 To keep
this in perspective, Compaq was paying Microsoft 
about twenty-five
dollars for each copy of Windows 95.
51 These numbers suggest that
default icons carried significant economic power 
and are why
Microsoft was ready to terminate business with one 
of its largest cus-
tomers when it threatened to remove Microsoft's 
browser from the
desktop. While Compaq was intimidated and conceded, 
Microsoft has
continued to battle with competitors such as RealNetworks
52 and Ko-
dak53 over default settings.
54
A second example illustrating the power of defaults 
is the use of
cookies technology found in Web browsers. Cookies 
allow Websites to
maintain information on their visitors, which 
raises privacy con-
cerns.55 Websites place cookies, small pieces of 
information, on a visi-
tor's computer. This allows Websites to 
identify and maintain
information on visitors by checking and updating 
the cookie informa-
tion. Users can manage the use of cookies through 
their Web brows-
ers. The default on all Web browsers is set 
to accept cookies. If
consumers want to limit privacy intrusions from 
cookies, they need to
50 Alec Klein, AOL to Offer Bounty for Space on New PCs, WASH. 
PosT, July 26, 2001,
at Al.
51 Graham Lea, MS Pricing for Win95: Compaq $25, 
IBM $46, THE REGISTER, Jun.
14,1999, http://www.theregister.com/1999/06/14/ms-pricing-for 
win95_ compaq.
52 RealNetworks filed a billion-dollar lawsuit 
partly over the fact that Microsoft
prohibited providing a desktop icon for RealNetworks. 
RealNetworks also argued
that PC manufacturers were not allowed to make 
any player other than Windows Me-
dia Player the default player. Even if a user chose 
RealNetworks media player as the
default player, Windows XP favored its own media 
player in certain situations. Evan
Hansen & David Becker, Real Hits Microsoft with 
$1 Billion Antitrust Suit, CNET
NEWS.COM, Dec. 18, 2003, http://news.com.com/Real+its+Microsoft+with+l+billion+
antitrust+suit/2100-
1 0 2 5 3-5129316.html; Microsoft, RealNetworks Battle, CNNMoNEY.
CoM, May 2, 2002, http://money.cnn.com/2002/05/02/technotogy/microsoft/; 
An-
drew Orlowski, Why Real Sued Microsoft, THE REGISTER, 
December 20, 2003, http://
www.theregister.co.uk/20
0 3 /12/20/why-real-sued-microsoft/.
53 Kodak considered antitrust action against 
Microsoft when its software could
not be easily made the default option for photo 
software. Microsoft's motivation was
clear-it was planning to charge a fee for 
images that were sent through Windows to
its partners. John R. Wilke & James Bandler, 
Shutter Bug: New Digital Camera Deals
Kodak a Lesson in Microsofts Ways, WALL ST. J., July 2, 
2001, at Al.
54 The issue over pre-installed software 
on the Windows operating system re-
emerged recently with news that Google and 
Dell are working together to pre-install
Google's software onto computers. The reports 
suggested that in exchange Google is
planning to pay Dell one billion dollars over 
the next three years. Robert A. Guth &
Kevin J. Delaney, Default Lines: Pressuring Microsoft, PC 
Makers Team Up with Its Software
Rivals, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 2006, at Al.
55 See Shah & Kesan, supra note 15, at 5 
(providing background on the cookies
technology).
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change the default setting themselves without any interactive
prompting.
To understand the implications of the default setting to accept
cookies, let us begin by recognizing that Internet users are concerned
about online privacy. A Pew Internet & American Life Project study
from August 2000 found that 84% of Internet users in the United
States were concerned about businesses and strangers getting their
personal data online.5 6 However, 56% did not know about cookies.57
More notably, 10% said they took steps to block cookies from their
PCs. 58 However, a study by Web Side Story found the cookie rejection
rate was less than 1%.59 These data show that while people were con-
cerned about their online privacy, they were unaware of the most sig-
nificant technology that affects online privacy. While a small
proportion of these people claimed to have changed the default set-
ting, the data actually show that a very small percentage, less than 1%,
actually change the default setting. In sum, despite the overwhelming
concern for privacy, almost everyone deferred to the default setting
and accepted cookies.
A final example on the power of defaults is the use of security
settings in Wi-Fi access points (APs). These A.Ps are a common con-
sumer technology for creating wireless networks inside homes and
businesses. Shah and Sandvig analyzed the data from hundreds of
thousands of APs to understand how people configure their APs.60
They found defaults programmed into APs to be powerful as half of
all users never changed any default setting on their APs. 61
One particular default setting the study examined was the use of
encryption in A.Ps. Encryption is widely recommended as a necessary
step for properly configuring an access point. The majority of access
points turn off encryption by default, resulting in only about 28% of
access points using encryption. 62 However, Microsoft's access points
56 SUSANNA-I Fox ET AL., TRUST AND PRIVACY ONLINE 4 (2000), available at http://
www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP-TrustPrivacy-Report.pdf (surveying users on online
privacy issues).
57 Id. at 3.
58 Id.
59 Dick Kelsey, Almost No One Rejects Cookies, NEWSBXTES NEWS NETWORK, Apr. 3,
2001, http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-mONEW/is-200LApril_3/ai
72736309 (discussing a study that measured cookie rejection rate).
60 RAJ[V SHAH & CHRISTIAN SAN1VIG, SOFTWARE DEFAULTS AS DE FACTO REGULA-
TION 7-8 (2005), available at http://web.si.umich.edu/tprc/papers/2005/427/TPRC
%20Wireless%20Defaults.pdf.
61 Id. at 16.
62 Id. at 11.
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turn on encryption by default if users follow the CD setup process. 63
As a result, 58% of Microsoft's access points are using encryption. 64
2Wire also turns on encryption by default in their access points lead-
ing to 96% of their access points using encryption. 65 These data show
an enormous shift in encryption from 28% to 96% by merely chang-
ing the default value.66
C. Defaults in Software Affect a Variety of Issues
Default settings in software affect a wide variety of fundamental
social policy issues. To illustrate this, we examine the defaults in a
popular file-sharing program known as Limewire. 67 Limewire con-
tains several default settings that promote file sharing. Although the
main purpose of the program is file sharing, there are several default
settings that affect a variety of fundamental societal concerns.
The first default setting in Limewire sets the upload bandwidth
default to 100%. This setting promotes using all of the computer's
available bandwidth for file sharing. Another default setting sets the
program to automatically connect to the network when the applica-
tion starts up. This ensures that file sharing starts immediately. A
third default setting treats users with fast computers and Internet con-
nections as an "ultrapeer." An "ultrapeer" helps other users download
faster, but demands a greater load on the user's computer. All three
of these default settings are used to promote file sharing. However,
these are not the only defaults in Limewire.
Limewire uses default settings for filtering search results by spe-
cific words, adult content, or file types. This setting affects free
speech, essentially censoring certain Websites from its users. Other
default settings define the community of file sharers. Limewire has a
default setting to share files only with people who are sharing files.
Users can set the minimum number of files an uploader has to share.
This feature defines the community's boundaries. It can exclude
"freeloaders" or people sharing only a few files. Limewire sets the de-
fault to one file and, thus, effectively allows everyone (including "free-
loaders") to share files. Finally, there is a default affecting social
communication determining whether the chat feature is on or off.
63 Id. at 12.
64 Id. at 11.
65 Id. at 12.
66 Id. at 11.
67 This subpart is based on our study of the Limewire file sharing program. The
observations are based on Limewire Basic Client version 2.1.3.
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Limewire's use of defaults demonstrates how defaults can affect a
wide variety of issues. As a matter of policy, defaults are good for a
number of reasons. First, defaults provide users with agency. Users
have a choice in the matter: They can go with the default option or
choose another setting. Second, a default setting guides the user by
providing a recommendation. However, there may be situations
where users do not need or should not have options. We discuss these
situations in more detail later, but the key point is sometimes we do
not want to give a user choices.
D. Cultural Context of Software Defaults
Defaults are important not only in affecting a person's actions,
but also in shaping norms and creating culture.6s This occurs in two
general ways. First, defaults can serve to reinforce and amplify ex-
isting norms. A simple example is that people know they should save
money. However, they often neglect to save on a day-to-day basis.
This led Thaler and Benartzi to craft a savings program that takes ad-
vantage of people's deference to defaults.69
Second, new communication technologies often incorporate de-
faults (sometimes unintentionally) that have cultural ramifications.
For example, consider the defaults in Wi-Fi technology that limit se-
curity. While these defaults limit security, they aid the creation of a
larger cultural movement toward the sharing of wireless networks and
the development of community wireless networking. As Sandvig
notes, the "mushrooming of free APs ... was the result not of a con-
scious altruism, it was the triumph of unreflective accidents." 70 The
accident here is that when a user takes an AP out of its packaging and
starts using it, it becomes open and free to others by default and not
by the conscious action of its owner.
There is a subtle but profound concern that default settings will
not be seen as defaults but accepted as unchangeable. After all, if
people don't know about defaults, they will assume that any alterna-
tive settings are impossible or unreasonable. This influence on peo-
68 See, e.g., Matt Ratto, Embedded Technical Expression: Code and the Leveraging of
Functionality, 21 INFO. Soc'y 205, 207-11 (2005) (discussing how software embeds ex-
pression in several ways while also expressing appropriate methods for doing tasks).
69 Richard H. Thaler & Shlomo Benartzi, Save More Tomorrow: Using Behavioral
Economics to Increase Employee Saving, 1l12J. POL. ECON. S164, S170-71 (2004) (propos-
ing the Save More Tomorrow savings plan that increases the contribution rate in con-
junction with raises, therefore relying on people's inertia to lead them to save at
higher rates).
70 Christian Sandvig, An Initial Assessment of Cooperative Action in Wi-Fi Networking,
28 TELECOMM. POL'Y 579, 591 (2004) (discussing the growth of the Wi-Fi networking).
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ple's perception of their control over software configuration is a core
concern with software regulation. This concern arises with the use of
filtering software. Everyday users will not notice Websites that are
blocked out, such as Websites presenting information on breast can-
cer or AIDS.71 Instead, they will just assume there is no information
on that topic or that the topic is unimportant. This can have a strik-
ing effect on a person's view and use of culture. This effect is the
result of software creating an artificial and unknowable barrier.72 We
discuss this issue further in Part III, focusing on how best to set
defaults.
II. UNDERSTANDING DEFAULTS
Once defaults are recognized as powerful in influencing people's
behavior, the next issue is to explain why people are swayed by default
settings. In this Part, we offer four different perspectives based on
extant scholarship for understanding or theorizing the effect of de-
faults on people's behavior and choices. Additionally, we offer an-
other perspective from our investigations into software defaults.
Subpart A focuses on work within computer science in the field of
Human-Computer Interaction (HCI). Subpart B examines the work
of behavioral economists. Subpart C considers the work of legal schol-
ars, largely those focusing on defaults in contract law. Subpart D of-
fers a perspective on technology defaults from a health
communication approach. Finally, subpart E considers the role of
technical sophistication for explaining why people may defer to de-
fault settings.
A. Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) Theory
Scholars within the Human-Computer Interaction (HCI) subfield
of computer science have developed theories and conducted research
on how people use computers. The most direct work on defaults has
been done by Cranor and Wright. 3 As an example, Cranor's group
gave careful thought to the default settings in their design of the
71 VICTORIA RIDEOUT ET AL., KAISER FAMILY FOUND., SEE No EVIL: How INTERNET
FILTERS AFFECT THE SEARCH FOR ONLINE HEALTH INFORMATION 6-10 (2002), available
at http://www.kaisernetworkorg/health cast/uploaded_files/InternetFiltering-
exec_summ.pdf (finding that software filters affect the ability of people to find health
information online).
72 Lee Tien, Architectural Regulation and the Evolution of Social Norms, 7 YALE J.L. &
TECH. 1, 18 (2004) (discussing whether software is an appropriate regulatory tool).
73 CRANOR & WRIGHT, supra note 21, at 6-7 (discussing the role of defaults and
wired-in settings for software designers).
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AT&T Privacy Bird, which is a Web browser plug-in that 
notifies users
about a Website's privacy policy.
74 While there is little research by
computer scientists directly on defaults, defaults have 
been consid-
ered in the context of system design and user customization. 
This
subpart reviews this research and then applies it to several 
examples of
software defaults in order to determine their usefulness 
for establish-
ing public policy regarding software defaults.
The user customization research focuses 
on how users tailor
software to their needs. This work is relevant 
because when users cus-
tomize software they are usually changing default 
settings. The princi-
ple findings are that people are more likely 
to customize a software
program as their experience with computers 
and time with the
software program increases.
7 5 The research has shown that while
users often change some software features, 
they often limit themselves
to changing the minimum necessary to use 
the software. 76 Mackay
recognizes this as "users 'satisfice' rather than 
optimize. '7 7 While the-
oretically users could carefully evaluate every 
possible option to cus-
tomize, they do not act that way. Instead, users 
view customization as
time consuming and troublesome and, therefore, 
avoid customizing
software.
The principles of system design illustrate how 
software developers
set defaults. As a starting point, it is useful to 
review the general prin-
ciples for user interfaces. One set of common 
sense guidelines comes
from researchers at IBM. They believe the interface 
should: 1) be sim-
ilar to known tasks; 2) protect the user from making mistakes; 
3) be
easy to learn; 4) be easy to use; 5) be easy to remember; 
and 6) pro-
vide fast paths for experienced users.
78 Once we understand these
guidelines, we can see why researchers like 
Dix believe that defaults
74 Lorrie Faith Cranor et al., User Interfaces for Privacy Agents, 
13 ACM TRANSAC-
TIONS ON COMPUTER-HUM. INTERACTION 
135, 143-57 (2006) (providing a case study
on developing software that addresses privacy 
concerns).
75 Mary Beth Rosson, Effects of Experience on Learning, Using and 
Evaluating a Text
Editor, 26 HUM. FACTORS 463, 473-74 (1984).
76 See Stanley R. Page et al., User Customization 
of a Word Processor, in HUMAN FAc-
TORS IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS 340, 344-45 (Michael Tauber 
ed., 1996).
77 Wendy E. Mackay, Triggers and Barriers 
to Customizing Software, in PROCEEDINGS
OF THE SIGCHI CONFERENCE ON HUMAN 
FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYSTEMS 153, 
159
(Scott P. Robertson et al. eds., 1991), available at 
http://insitu.lri.fr
/
-mackay/pdf
files/CHI91.Triggers.pdf.
78 Edward J. See & Douglas C. Woestendiek, 
Effective User Interfaces: Some Common
Sense Guidelines, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 5TH 
ANNUAL INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
SYSTEMS DOCUMENTATION 87, 88 (Virginia DeBuys ed., 
1986), available at http://doi.
acm.org/10.1145/318723.318738 (follow "PDF" hyperlink) 
(discussing guidelines for
developing a user interface).
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"can assist the user by passive recall .... It also reduces the number of
physical actions necessary to input a value. Thus, providing default
values is a kind of error prevention mechanism." 79 Similarly, Preece
writes that "the default value is usually the most frequently used or
safest option, indicated by a thickened border around a button, or
some similar visual device." 0 Furthermore, consider industry guide-
lines on defaults, such as the Apple Human Interface Guidelines. It
states:
The default button should be the button that represents the action
that the user is most likely to perform if that action isn't potentially
dangerous....
Don't use a default button if the most likely action is danger-
ous-for example, if it causes a loss of user data. When there is no
default button, pressing Return or Enter has no effect; the user
must explicitly click a button. This guideline protects users from
accidentally damaging their work by pressing Return or Enter. You
can consider using a safe default button, such as Cancel.8 1
There are two core principles in all three approaches described
above (Dix, Preece, and Apple) for setting defaults. The first princi-
ple is that the default should be set to a value appropriate for novice
users. An application of this is seen in Cranor's work on the Privacy
Bird software when it considers novice users by recognizing that
changing defaults can be time consuming and confusing, because
users risk "messing up" their software.8 2 The second principle is that
the default should be set to a value that will improve efficiency. Effi-
ciency could be a sensible value, a value least likely to cause errors, or
"[w]hat do people enter or choose most often."83
79 ALAN Dix ET AL., HUMAN-COMPUTER INTERACTION 173 (2d ed. Prentice Hall
Eur. 1998) (1994) (discussing the role of defaults).
80 JENNY PREECE ET AL., HUMAN-CoMPUTER INTERACTION 298 (1994); see also SUSAN
L. FOWLER & VICTOR R. STANWICK, THE GUI STYLE GUIDE 19 (1995) (encouraging use
of defaults as a time saving device in data-entry programs in which a certain result is
overwhelmingly more common than others). In the context of privacy, Beckwith ar-
gues that since users trust computer systems to be benign, the defaults should be set
conservatively. The defaults should also be understandable and well defined so that
users can depend on them. Richard Beckwith, Designing for Ubiquity: The Perception of
Privacy, PERVASIVE COMPUTING, Apr.-June 2003, at 40, 46 (2003).
81 APPLE COMPUTER, INC., APPLE HUMAN INTERFACE GUIDELINES 214 (2006), availa-
ble at http://developer.apple.com/documentation/UserExperience/Conceptual/
OSXHtGuidelines/OSXHIGuidelines.pdf.
82 Cranor et al., supra note 74, at 54.
83 SUSAN FOWLER & VICTOR STANWICK, WEB APPLICATION DESIGN HANDBOOK 79
(2004).
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Now that we have determined the two core principles 
(consider
novice users and efficiency) for computer scientists, the next step 
is
applying them to our examples. The first example 
concerns default
icons on the desktop of Windows operating systems. 
HCI suggests
that default icons should be set up for the most 
common programs
and for programs and features most used by novices. 
Because a Web
browser is an important feature, it would make sense 
to include an
icon for one. The question becomes whether icons 
for two competing
browsers would confuse novices or increase efficiency 
by allowing
users to select the browser they need. This is a difficult 
determination
and requires user testing to determine the better 
outcome. Note that
the HCI approach does not address the issue of competition.
The second example concerns the privacy risks of enabling 
cook-
ies. The principle of protecting novices suggests 
that cookies should
be blocked until people are adequately informed of 
the risk they pose
to information security. However, blocking cookies 
from the outset
would drastically impair the Web experience for most 
novices. From
an efficiency standpoint, it is important to determine 
the important
role cookies play and ask why they are ubiquitous; 
in other words, do
they make using the Web more efficient for users? 
Once again, con-
flicting principles provide little guidance for setting 
the default.
In the third example of wireless security, if the principle 
is pro-
tecting novices, then the default should be set to 
encryption. How-
ever, from the efficiency standpoint the issue is 
more complicated
because most users don't use encryption. But, it 
is likely that most
experienced and knowledgeable users would use encryption. 
Until we
know why people do not choose encryption, either 
from informed or
uninformed decisionmaking, we cannot determine 
which default
would be more efficient. The lack of specificity for 
what is efficient
leads to problems in setting this default based on 
HCI principles of
efficiency.
From a policy perspective, both existing rationales 
(consider nov-
ice users and consider efficiency) for setting defaults are 
far too
vague. First, what is a novice user? Is it their knowledge, 
experience,
education, or ability to use a computer? It is not 
clear what defines a
novice user. Moreover, why should we protect 
novice users? Second,
efficiency is an ambiguous concept. Is the default 
setting most effi-
cient for the software developers, expert users, or 
novices? Or is it the
setting that provides the most utility? Efficiency 
also assumes that it is
possible to determine and calculate the costs and 
benefits of a default
setting. However, many default settings impact 
fuzzy values, such as
privacy, or externalities, such as security, which 
are difficult to calcu-
late. While these rationales are undoubtedly 
useful to developers,
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they provide an insufficient basis for setting defaults 
from a policy
perspective.
The difference in rationales can be explained by 
the differences
in the goals being pursued by developers and 
policymakers. Com-
puter scientists typically focus on the performance 
of software. To this
end, they break down software into small pieces 
and optimize each
piece, keeping their goals technically oriented 
rather than focusing
on larger, complicated social values. From a policy 
perspective, how-
ever, the goal is not only ensuring that the 
software works, but also
ensuring that it comports with our societal 
norms.
B. Behavioral Economics
Behavioral economists have analyzed how defaults should 
be set,
largely in the context of law and social policy.
4 For example, Mad-
rian's research on a 401 (k) plan discussed earlier is one 
of several
studies that have shown the power of defaults 
on decisionmaking in
everyday life.8 5 Default settings are interesting 
to behavioral econo-
mists, because they appear to conflict with a 
key theorem in behav-
ioral economics. The Coase theorem holds 
that a default rule does
not matter if there are no transaction costs.
8 6 The default rule does
not matter because the parties will bargain to 
a common result that is
efficient for both parties. However, there are 
numerous empirical
studies showing a bias toward deferring to defaults, 
a bias which is
counter to what the Coase theorem would suggest, 
leading behavioral
economists to explore what is missing from the 
Coase theorem. In
this subpart, we discuss three explanations from 
behavioral econo-
mists for why people defer to defaults: bounded 
rationality, cognitive
biases, and the legitimating effect. We then apply 
them to several ex-
amples of software defaults to examine their usefulness.
The first explanation involves the concept of bounded 
rationality.
People do not change defaults when they are 
uninformed that an-
other choice exists. If a person does not know 
about the possibility of
changing an option or the ramifications of each 
choice, then a default
setting is equivalent to a fixed setting. An example 
of this is how peo-
ple defer to defaults for cookies, because they 
are either uninformed
or misinformed about the cookies function. The 
Pew study in 2000
84 See generally Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling 
the Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:
An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989) (discussing 
defaults in con-
tract law); Cass R. Sunstein, Switching the Default Rule, 77 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 106 (2002)
(discussing defaults in the context of employment law).
85 Madrian & Shea, supra note 29, at 1158-61.
86 R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 
1, 15 (1960).
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
found that 84% of Internet users were concerned with privacy, but
56% did not know about cookies.8 7 Several years later, people are still
uninformed about cookies. A 2005 survey found that 42% of respon-
dents agreed with patently false statements such as, "Internet cookies
make my computer susceptible to viruses" and "Internet cookies make
my computer unsafe for personal information." 8 Another 30% ad-
mitted that they know nothing about Internet cookies. Hence, users
defer to the default setting that enables cookies 89 We cannot expect
users to change default settings for issues about which they are
uninformed.
A second explanation from behavioral economists is that cogni-
tive biases may impede people from changing defaults. These cogni-
tive biases include the status quo bias, the omission bias, and the
endowment effect. The status quo bias leads people to favor the status
quo over a change. Samuelson and Zeckhauser describe the status
quo bias as favoring inertia over action or as having an anchoring ef-
fect.90 To explain, individuals place greater value on the current state
and, thus, believe they will lose more if they make a change. The sta-
tus quo bias is further explained by the omission bias. The emphasis
here is not on the current state, but on the fact that people often
judge actions to be worse than omissions.9' The omission bias sug-
gests that individuals prefer to be hurt because some action was not
taken rather than equally hurt because some action was taken. In the
realm of software, the omission bias suggests people will avoid chang-
ing a setting because they fear it might "break" the computer more
than they fear "breaking" the computer by not taking any action.
The status quo and omission biases provide reasonable explana-
tions for why people defer to defaults. To illustrate the differences
between these explanations, consider a security setting for a firewall in
a computer operating system. When a firewall is turned on, it pro-
vides the user with increased protection. Either bias could come into
play in determining whether a user turns on the firewall when the
87 See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
88 Press Release, BURST Media, BURST Media Reports Consumer View of Cook-
ies: "Don't Understand Them, Can Be Good, but, Should Be Deleted" (June 2, 2005),
http://www.burstmedia.com/release/pressreleases/pr-06-02-05.htm (presenting
the results of a survey on the knowledge and perception of Internet cookies).
89 Id.
90 William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, I
J. RFsK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 8-10, 37-38 (1988) (examining the role of status quo effect
with several experiments).
91 Ilana Ritov & Jonathan Baron, Status-Quo and Omission Biases, 5 J. RIsK & UN-
CERTAINYv 49, 50 (1992).
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default is set for the firewall to be off. For example, a user knows that
the firewall will protect her computer from certain hackers but may be
nervous about enabling the firewall, because she is afraid it may
"break" the computer. The status-quo bias suggests that the current
state (a working computer) is a safe state and that leaving that state
could result in a loss. Furthermore, the user is choosing to accept a
possible harm due to omission versus a possible harm due to commis-
sion (turning on the firewall could lead the computer to malfunc-
tion). As such, the omission bias comes into play.
Another cognitive bias is known as the endowment effect. The
endowment effect refers to how people place more value on settings
when the default initially favors them than when the default is set to
favor another party.92 Empirical research has shown the endowment
effect to occur when people demand much more money to give up
something than they would be willing to pay to acquire it.93 The en-
dowment effect suggests that the initial default setting affects how de-
faults are valued by users. These valuations may make it very difficult
for a later switch from one default setting to another one. This effect
means that policymakers need to carefully consider the initial default
setting.
The third explanation that behavioral economists have recog-
nized to explain default preference is the legitimating effect.94 This
effect arises because people believe defaults convey information on
how people should act. Defaults are assumed to be reasonable, ordi-
nary, and sensible practices. As a result, people can be resistant to
changing a default setting. This assumption about defaults is not sur-
prising. For example, because of product liability law, manufacturers
have a duty to warn of dangerous products95 and a duty to "design
out" dangers in a product.96 Consequently, when people use software,
92 See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion,
and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. EcoN. PERS?. 193, 194-97 (1991) (providing a good back-
ground on the endowment effect).
93 Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 Nw. U. L. REv.
1227, 1228, 1232-35 (2003) (reviewing empirical evidence of the endowment effect
and showing how the effect broadly affects the law).
94 Sunstein, supra note 84, at 116 ("[T]he significant effect from the default rule
is probably a product of its informational signal .... (Tihe initially proposed plan
carries a certain legitimacy, perhaps because it seems to have resulted from some
conscious thought about what makes the most sense for the most people.").
95 See M. Stuart Madden, The Duty to Warn in Products Liability: Contours and Criti-
cism, 11 J. PROD. LIAB. 103, 104 (1988) (discussing the duty to warn by
manufacturers).
96 See RESTATEMENT (TIRD) OF TORTS § 2 cmt. d (1998) (noting that manufactur-
ers have a duty to design out dangers on a reasonable basis).
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they assume that defaults are reasonable and sensible; otherwise, an-
other choice would have been selected.
The approach of behavioral economists has focused on reasons
why people comport with defaults. This is a different approach from
the one within HCI, which focused on how we should set defaults.
Applying the behavioral economists' insights, we gain a better under-
standing of why people defer to defaults. However, behavioral econo-
mists do not provide a simple answer for how best to set defaults.
They realize there are different standards for judging defaults, such as
efficiency, distribution, and welfare. 97 Instead, as we point out in the
prescriptive subpart, their most important contribution is explaining
how information flow between developers and users leads users to de-
fer to defaults, thereby increasing the power of defaults.
Let us test the behavioral economists' explanations with our three
examples of desktop icons, cookies, and wireless security. In the first
example regarding the choice of default desktop icons, the endow-
ment effect and legitimating effect can explain the companies' con-
flict over setting the default icons. According to the endowment
effect, as the initial default setting favored Microsoft's browser, users
are going to demand much more to give up the default Microsoft icon
than they would be willing to pay to set it if the default did not favor
Microsoft. The legitimating effect would lead people to favor one
browser over another. If there is only one icon on the desktop, peo-
ple are going to assume that it is the sensible or reasonable browser to
use. This is recognized by the browser companies and explains why
they care so much about the initial default icons.
In the second example involving enabling or disabling cookies,
behavioral economists would point out the issue of bounded rational-
ity in determining user choices. As discussed earlier, since people do
not know about cookies, they cannot be expected to change the de-
fault settings. 95 Moreover, as the default is set to accept cookies, the
legitimating effect explains why people would accept cookies rather
than not, because, according to this effect, people trust or defer to the
pre-determined selection. In the third example involving encryption
for wireless security, all three cognitive biases come into play. Most
people do not understand wireless security, and cognitive biases such
as the omission bias and the status quo bias suggest that people will be
reluctant to change the default to avoid change or potentially damag-
ing their computers through their actions. Furthermore, because the
access points come with no encryption enabled, people are likely to
97 Sunstein, supra note 84, at 123-28.
98 See supra text accompanying notes 56-59.
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assume that this is a reasonable setting, and there is no reason to
change the default setting, thus demonstrating the legitimating bias.
These last two examples involving cookies and encryption show how
defaults affect our actions and influence our preferences and norms.
After all, the initial settings here will likely lead people to believe that
cookies are desirable and that no encryption is desirable. It is in this
way that defaults can subtly, but profoundly, affect the production and
transmission of culture.
C. Legal Scholarship
Having discussed the explanations provided by computer scien-
tists and behavioral economists to account for default values, we now
turn to legal scholarship. Legal scholars have long been interested in
defaults, because default settings are found throughout the law in
contracts,99 labor and employment law, 100 and inheritance law.' 01
Contract law scholars have focused especially on the role of defaults.
This subpart considers two key issues concerning defaults as under-
stood from the perspective of contract law. The first issue concerns
what are the default laws, as opposed to mandatory laws, that people
cannot waive. The second issue focuses on the role of consent when
people enter into contracts and how courts enforce these contracts.
After covering these two issues, we apply their insights to our exam-
ples of software defaults involved in desktop icons, cookies, and wire-
less security.
Contract law scholars rely on a concept of default rules, which is
similar to the concept of defaults in software. For example, consider
Barnett's discussion about the default rule approach in the context of
contract law and how he employs the analogy of software defaults:
The default rule approach analogizes the way that contract law
fills gaps in the expressed consent of contracting parties to the way
that word-processing programs set our margins for us in the ab-
sence of our expressly setting them for ourselves. A word-process-
ing program that required us to set every variable needed to write a
page of text would be more trouble than it was worth. Instead, all
word-processing programs provide default settings for such vari-
ables as margins, type fonts, and line spacing and leave it to the user
99 Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law,
113 YALE L.J. 541, 594-609 (2003) (discussing the role of defaults in contract law).
100 See generally Sunstein, supra note 84 (discussing the default rule in the context
of employment law).
101 See generally Adam J. Hirsch, Default Rules in Inheritance Law: A Problem in Search
of Its Context, 73 FORDRAM L. REv. 1031, 1078-94 (2004) (discussing the default rule in
the context of inheritance law).
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to change any of these default settings to better suit his or her
purposes.'0 2
For Barnett, the default rule approach refers to how certain obli-
gations and responsibilities are placed on the parties in the absence of
manifested assent to the contrary.' 0 3 If a party wishes to change a
rule, he or she must specify so in the contract. This approach in con-
tract law is analogous to how software defaults place certain obliga-
tions or limitations on the users, unless the users change the defaults.
Legal scholars have also recognized that there are some rules that
parties cannot change by contract. These are known as immutable
rules.10 4 For example, the warranty of merchantability is a default
rule that parties can waive, while the duty to act in good faith cannot
be waived.1 0 5 The difference between default rules and immutable
rules is shown in an example by Ware:
[T] he tort law giving me the right not to be punched in the nose is
a default rule because I can make an enforceable contract to enter a
boxing match .... In contrast, the law giving a consumer the right
to buy safe goods is mandatory because it applies no matter what
the contract terms say.' 0 6
The concept of immutable rules by legal scholars is analogous to how
rules may be wired into software. The commonality here is that con-
sumers or users cannot change or modify these immutable or wired-in
rules.
An area of considerable controversy regarding immutable rules is
intellectual property law. Radin has shown how contractual agree-
ments and technology are creating new legal regimes, which over-
shadow the existing legal infrastructure of the state. 10 7 An example is
whether "fair use" is an immutable rule or a default rule that parties
can bargain away. Another related concern over immutable rules is
the use of arbitration agreements. Ware argues that because arbitra-
tors may not apply law correctly and courts are reluctant to change the
results of arbitration, arbitration allows parties to sidestep mandatory
102 Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78
VA. L. REV. 821, 824 (1992).
103 Id. at 825.
104 Ayres & Gertner, supra note 84, at 87.
105 Id.
106 Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: Privatizing Law Through
Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703, 710 (1999).
107 MargaretJane Radin, Regulation by Contract, Regulation by Machine, 160J. INST-
TUTIONAL & THEORETiCAL ECON. 142, 142-51 (2004) (discussing immutable rules in
contracts),
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rules. 108 In effect, by using arbitration, it is possible to turn a
mandatory rule into a default rule. This ambiguity between what de-
fines default rules and mandatory rules in the law leads Radin to urge
scholars and policymakers to firmly establish society's mandatory
rules. 109
A second issue of concern for contract scholars is the consensual
model of contract. Much of contract law is based on the assumption
that consumers have consented to default terms through a bargaining
process and a meeting of the minds. However, the reality is that most
consumer contracts do not function like this. 1 0 This has led contract
scholars to examine a number of different forms of contracts and
identify their flaws. Their research is relevant to defaults, because the
types of agreements they study are closer in form to the default set-
tings that consumers "consent" to in software.
Adhesion contracts are standard form contracts that are
presented on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis."' In this situation the con-
sumer may be subject to terms in the contract over which he or she
has little control. The modern approach has been for courts to refuse
enforcement of adhesion contracts./a 2 The celebrated case of Wil-
liams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture'1 concerned the enforcement of a
standard form contract. Judge Wright wrote that courts have the
power to refuse enforcement of contracts found to be unconsciona-
ble. 1 4 His opinion also points out the key issues for determining
whether a contract is unconscionable, because it is an adhesion
contract:
Ordinarily, one who signs an agreement without full knowledge of
its terms might be held to assume the risk that he has entered a one-
sided bargain. But when a party of little bargaining power, and
hence little real choice, signs a commercially unreasonable contract
with little or no knowledge of its terms, it is hardly likely that his
consent, or even an objective manifestation of his consent, was ever
108 Ware, supra note 106, at 711.
109 Radin, supra note 107, at 142-43.
110 See John E. Murray, The Standardized Agreement Phenomena in the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 735, 739-41 (1982) (discussing the issues with
integrating standard form contract law into the Restatement (Second) of Contracts);
W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power,
84 HARv. L. REV. 529, 539-44 (1971) (developing legal principles for standard form
contracts).
111 See Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARv. L.
REv. 1173, 1177 (1983) (providing a good definition of standard form contracts).
112 See id. at 1195-96.
113 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
114 Id. at 449-50.
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given to all the terms. In such a case the usual rule that the terms of
the agreement are not to be questioned should be abandoned and
the court should consider whether the terms of the contract are so
unfair that enforcement should be withheld.' 1 5
The issue of adhesion contracts is directly applicable to software.
There are agreements that users routinely enter into when they open
a box of software or click on an End User License Agreement from
software they have downloaded. These agreements are known as
shrink-wrap or click-wrap agreements.11 6 In these transactions, there
is no negotiation on the terms between the parties; consumers are
presented with software on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis. The situation is
analogous to what Judge Wright discussed in Williams.' 17 The parties
have little bargaining power, and it is an open question whether they
have truly consented to the terms. For example, many everyday con-
tracts (and some licenses for software) contain pre-dispute arbitration
clauses. Consumers do not bargain for these clauses, but these terms
are put forth in standard form contracts on a "take-it-or-leave-it" ba-
sis.'111 This has led to debate over whether consumers should be sub-
ject to all the terms. Some scholars argue that the terms should be
unenforceable, because consumers have not assented to them." 9
However, Judge Easterbrook in an influential decision held that
shrinkwrap agreements are enforceable in certain circumstances. 2 0
Contract scholars have argued that the solution to adhesion con-
tracts is that the courts "should consider whether the terms of the
agreement are so unfair that enforcement should be withheld."' 2 1
This means courts can choose either to refuse to enforce a contract or
115 Id.
116 Kevin W. Grierson, Annotation, Enforceability of "Clickwrap" or "Shrinkwrap"
Agreements Common in Computer Software, Hardware, and Internet Transactions, 106 A.L.R.
5TH 309, 317 nn.1-2 (2003).
117 350 F.2d at 449.
118 Richard M. Alderman, Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer Contracts: A
Call for Reform, 38 Hous. L. REv. 1237, 1246-49 (2001); see also Margaret Moses, Priva-
tized "Justice, "36 Lov. U. CH. L.J. 535, 536-38 (2005) (focusing on how the Supreme
Court has influenced the use of arbitration provisions); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing
Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Com-
pelled Arbitration, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 33, 81 (analyzing the Supreme Court's broad en-
dorsement of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements).
119 See, e.g., Batya Goodman, Note, Honey, I Shrink-Wrapped the Consumer: The
Shrink-Wrap Agreement as an Adhesion Contract, 21 CARDozo L. REV. 319, 354-59 (1999)
(arguing that adhesion contract principles should apply to shrinkwrap agreements);
see also Mark A. Lemley, Shrinkwraps in Cyberspace, 35 JuRiMETRICS J. 311, 317-18
(1995) (predicting many of the legal issues with shrinkwrap agreements).
120 ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996).
121 Rakoff, supra note 111, at 1192 (quoting Williams, 350 F.2d at 450).
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to rewrite the terms of the contract. However, 
when we consider de-
faults in software, enforcement is automatic 
and nonreviewable
1 2 2
There is little in common between how contracts 
are enforced and
how software is enforced. This reflects a serious 
distinction between
law and software and will be discussed later in 
a discussion on how
policymakers should set defaults.1
23
Now we will apply the work of legal scholars 
from above to our
three software default examples. In the first example 
involving de-
fault desktop icons, the issue is what party (Compaq or 
Microsoft)
should set the default terms. At first glance it might 
appear that Com-
paq has significant bargaining power because 
of its size and expertise
compared to other computer hardware producers. 
However, Compaq
was reliant on a monopoly software producer, and 
there is justifiable
concern over whether there was a true bargaining 
process. As we have
seen, Microsoft's behavior later led to government 
antitrust investiga-
tions into whether Microsoft was behaving unfairly.
1 24 Nonetheless, in
this case, Compaq backed down in order to satisfy 
Microsoft's demand
to restore its Internet Explorer browser icon as 
a default desktop set-
ting.1 25 Compaq's only remedy would have been 
a judicial remedy,
which was uncertain, costly, time consuming, 
and would have hin-
dered its relationship with a crucial supplier. This 
points to a crucial
problem with default settings in software-there 
is no enforcement
process for users who take issue with software settings. 
It is not readily
apparent what a party can do if he or she is subject to "unfair" 
default
terms. While one can refuse to use the software, 
this option is often
an unreasonable course of action because of 
the lack of comparable
substitutes.
While the first example of desktop icons focuses 
on defaults and
producers, the second example (cookies) and third example 
(wireless
security) are all situations where consumers accepted default 
settings
without truly consenting. It could be argued 
that most consumers
would not have consented to these settings 
if they were apprised of
the privacy and security risks. Nevertheless, 
they had to take these
default settings on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis. This 
raises several ques-
tions: the first is whether this is analogous to 
a classic adhesion con-
tract. The key difference here is that consumers 
are free to change
the default settings. In an adhesion contract, 
consumers cannot
122 James Grimmelmann, Regulation by 
Software, 114 YALE L.J. 1719, 1738-41
(2005) (noting how software rules cannot be ignored).
123 See infra Part III.
124 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. 
Supp. 2d 9, 60 (D.D.C. 1999).
125 Id.
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change the terms. Second, the main remedy against adhesion con-
tracts is not applicable to software defaults. Consumers cannot look
to the courts to require manufacturers to change a setting because the
consumers did not properly consent. While courts hold contract
terms unenforceable, they would be justifiably hesitant to require
changes to default settings that consumers could readily modify
themselves.
Legal scholarship provides useful insights into the legitimacy of
software defaults. We rely on these insights to discuss how to set de-
fault settings. After all, policymakers need to understand what de-
faults are acceptable and what settings cannot be default settings.
While research on adhesion contracts does not transfer to software, it
does provide a useful template for understanding whether people
consented to a transaction in other contexts. In a later section on
how policymakers should set defaults, we point out that this contrac-
tual notion of consent is a useful step in evaluating whether users were
informed or not about default settings.
D. Health Communication
Communication scholars studying risky behavior prefer yet an-
other approach for addressing software defaults than those used by
computer scientists, behavioral economists, or legal scholars. Al-
though LaRose works within health communications, he is trying to
transfer insights from his field to the field of software.12 6 He argues
that online policy issues are "too much of a moving target to ever be
assured by technical means alone."127 LaRose instead advocates edu-
cating consumers to protect themselves.' 2 His work is rooted in
heath communications, which focuses on changing individuals' risky
behavior. 12 9 Using health communication research as his basis, La-
Rose suggests an approach for improving online security by increasing
126 Robert LaRose et al., Understanding Online Safety Behavior: A Multivariate
Model (May 31, 2005), http://www.msu.edu/-isafety/papers/ICApanelmut2l.htm.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 He builds upon protection motivation theory (PMT), which had its origins in
"health communication messages targeting risky behavior." Id. However, LaRose
notes that this model has been applied to a variety of risk management issues, from
crime control to exercise participation and environment protection. PMT suggests
that protective behavior "is motivated by perceptions of the threat, efficacy, and con-
sequences associated with taking protective measures and maintaining maladaptive
behavior." Id.
[VOL. 82:2
SETTING SOFTWARE DEFAULTS
self-efficacy through means such as "verbal persuasion, anxiety reduc-
tion, and progressive mastery."' 30
While we recognize a role for education and training in address-
ing software specifications, we believe LaRose overstates its usefulness.
Software often hides subtle but important settings from its users. We
simply cannot expect people to devote their resources and capacity to
become the ubergeeks that modern software requires. For example,
we cannot expect the uninitiated users who rely on Web browsers and
wireless technologies to investigate all the possible risks of these every-
day technologies. Instead, these users "satisfice" (to use Mackay's
term)131 and, therefore, defer to the settings that are given to them.
While policymakers should support educating users, it is also neces-
sary to recognize the elephant in the room-the difficulty of master-
ing software. Until software comports with our established norms and
is easy to use, people are not going to be capable of addressing funda-
mental online policy concerns alone.
E. The Missing Piece of Technical Ability
One understudied reason why people do not change defaults is
their lack of technical sophistication. In these cases, people know
they ought to change the default, but cannot figure out how to do so.
A crucial factor affecting their technical inadequacy is the usability of
software. Usability is a broad field that cuts across computer science,
psychology, and design. Two examples that highlight this problem
are security and pop-up advertising.
People are very concerned about security. As the introduction
noted, 32 software sales show security software is one of the most pop-
ular items purchased. 133 However, these same well-informed and mo-
tivated individuals, who bought security software, have computer
systems with significant security problems. Indeed, 81% of home com-
puters lack core security protections, such as recently updated anti-
virus software, properly configured firewall and/or spyware protec-
tion.13 4 The best explanation for this discrepancy is that people lack
the technical sophistication to properly configure their computers.
Another similar example that illustrates how a lack of technologi-
cal sophistication affects people's propensity to rely on defaults is the
inability of people to avoid pop-up ads. Surveys show that 77% of
130 Id.
131 Mackay, supra note 77, at 159.
132 See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
133 See NPD, Top-Selling, supra note 6.
134 ONLINF SAFETY STUDY, supra note 7, at 2.
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Americans find that telemarketing calls are "always 
annoying" - and
78% of Americans consider pop-up ads "very 
annoying."1 6 In re-
sponse to these annoyances, it is estimated that 
over 60% of house-
holds have signed up for the FTC's Do Not 
Call Registry.'3 7 In
contrast, only about 25% of people have installed 
blocking software
for pop-up ads.1 38 This discrepancy between 
people's proactive ap-
proach to deterring telephone marketing and 
their acceptance of In-
ternet marketing pop-ups is best explained by 
the technical difficulty
of finding, installing, and configuring pop-up 
ad blockers as com-
pared with signing up for the FTC's Do Not 
Call Registry, which re-
quires people to complete a simple 
form or call a toll-free number. 
1 3 9
These two examples illustrate that deference 
to software defaults
is explained by a number of factors besides 
those discussed in the
fields of computer science, economics, law 
and communications, one
of which is usability. It is not enough for people 
to understand they
that need to change a default; they also need 
to understand how to
change it. This requires some technical capacity 
on their part as well
as a usable software interface.
III. SETTING DEFAULTS
Knowing how powerfully default settings can 
affect people's be-
havior and choices leads to questions about 
how best to set defaults.
This Part focuses on how policymakers ought 
to set defaults. The very
notion that policymakers should be engaged 
with influencing the de-
sign of software has been criticized. Tien begins 
his article by noting
the very different genealogy of law and architectural 
regulation in the
135 David Krane, National Do Not Call Registry Popular, 
but Public Perception of Impact
on Calls Unrealistic, HARRIS INTERACTIVE, Sept. 4, 
2003, http://www.harfisinteractive.
com/harris_poll/index.asp?PID=
4 00.
136 Margaret Kane, Pop-ups, the Ads We Love to Hate, 
CNET NEwS.COM, Jan. 14,
2003, http://news.com.com/
2 100-1023-980563.html (noting results from a
GartnerG2 survey).
137 FCC, TRENDS IN TELEPHONE SERVICE 1-2 (2003), available 
at http://www.fcc.
gov/Bureaus/Common Carnier/Reports/FCCStateLink/iAD/trend803.pdf 
(not-
ing that 104 million households had telephone service 
as of November 2002); FTC,
ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FOR FY 2003 AND 2004 PURSUANT 
TO THE Do NOT CALL
IMPLEMENTATION ACT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE Do 
NOT CALL REGISTRY 1 (2005),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/donotcall/
0 5 1 0 04dncfyo3O4.pdf [hereinafter
Do NOT CALL REGISTRY] (noting that more than sixty-four 
million phone numbers
were entered into the registry).
138 Stefanie Olsen, New IE May Burst Pop-up Bubble, 
CNET NEWs.COM, Nov. 24,
2003, http://news.com.com/2100-10
24
_3-5110805.html (discussing estimates of the
use of pop-up blocking software).
139 Do NOT CALL REGISTRY, supra note 137, 
at 2-3.
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context of software. 140 This leads him to argue that software operates
surreptitiously as compared with law, which is based around public
deliberation and an enforcement process.' 4 1 He is concerned that
the surreptitious nature of software leads people to unquestioningly
view software features as part of the background and not as something
that is intended to control us. 1 42 An example of this surreptitious na-
ture is with software filtering, which may lead us to "forget" about cer-
tain types of content.143 This leads Tien to express extreme
reluctance about relying on software as a method of regulation.144
We recognize Tien's concerns, but his concerns are much weaker
in the case of defaults. Policymakers are typically not creating default
settings, but instead are trying to tune existing default settings to max-
imize social welfare. In some cases, if policyrnakers do not intervene
and switch a default setting then people will be worse off. Also the
process of policy intervention into defaults will undoubtedly highlight
the role of software and its malleability. This should dispel many of
the concerns that Tien has raised.
This next subpart begins by considering the threshold question
of whether there should even be a default setting in software for par-
ticular functions. The argument here is largely based upon the work
of legal scholars, who have analyzed whether a law should be immuta-
ble or a default. The second subpart then focuses on how defaults
should be set. In providing guidance, we rely on key insights from
several disciplines on understanding how defaults operate. As a start-
ing point, we rely on behavioral economists' analysis of defaults with
the understanding that behavioral economists have explored how de-
faults should be set for a variety of public policy issues. However, in
discussing how defaults should be set, we also rely on the observations
of computer scientists on the role of user customization and the goal
of efficiency. Finally, legal analysis of the role of consent, as well as
our emphasis on a user's technical sophistication, is also integrated
into our recommendations. We also include flowcharts as well as a
subpart applying these flowcharts to the cookies and wireless security
example.
140 Tien, supra note 72, at 4-12.
141 Id. at 11-12.
142 Id. at 14.
143 See supra text accompanying notes 71-72.
144 Tien, supra note 72, at 14.
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A. Default or Wired-In
A threshold issue when setting software defaults is whether there
should be a default setting or a wired-in setting. A wired-in setting is
in effect a mandatory rule. As a starting point, consider the earlier
analysis by legal scholars on the conflicts between default rules and
mandatory rules in law.145 Within law, there are a set of rights that are
clearly nonwaivable, for example, in the areas of legal enforcement or
redress of grievances, human rights, and politically weak or vulnerable
rights. 146 Practical examples are safety regulations and the right to
family leave.' 47 The question then becomes, are there similar limita-
tions on wired-in settings, and how can policymakers identify these
settings? We explore this issue by first considering public policy limi-
tations on wired-in settings and then move on to a pragmatic evalua-
tion for identifying wired-in settings.
Software is malleable and can be manipulated in such a way as to
limit traditional legal regimes. The classic example is the use of Digi-
tal Rights Management software, which may limit the ability of a user
to copy content or even destroys content after a certain period of
time. 148 The twist is that instead of using terms in a contract, a devel-
oper can incorporate the terms into the software. This ability to use a
wired-in setting or a technological protection measure (TPM)' 49 is a
way of substituting contract terms with technology, thereby forcing
the user to adhere to the developers' preferences. Other examples of
how developers use TPMs to replace contract terms could affect distri-
bution of the software or its content (e.g., limiting the number of
computers it can operate on) or replacing restrictions on personal
versus commercial use with numerical limits (e.g., limiting consumer
version of photo editing software to 1000 photos). In these cases,
technology settings are replacing contract terms.
145 See supra text accompanying notes 104-09 (discussing immutable rules in the
law).
146 Margaret Jane Radin, Machine Rule: The Latest Challenge to Law 22 (Jan. 31,
2005) (on file with author), available at http://www.aals.org/2005midyear/contracts/
RadinmaterialsMachineRule.pdf (arguing generally that the law should be extended
or interpreted to make rights in these categories harder to waive or non-waivable).
147 Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 & 42 U.S.C.
§ 3142-1 (2000) (stating the nonwaivable right to certain safety regulations); Family
and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified in scattered
sections of 5 and 29 U.S.C.) (stating the nonwaivable right to family leave).
148 Ariel Katz, The Potential Demise of Another Natural Monopoly: New Technologies and
the Administration of Performing Rights, 2 J. COMPETITION, L. & ECON. 245, 248-51
(2006) (discussing digital rights management in the context of music downloads).
149 Radin, supra note 146, at 2.
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The issue then becomes are there any limitations to wired-in set-
tings? Radin suggests that we think of wired-in settings as technologi-
cal self-help. She writes, "Using TPM's is more like landowners
building high fences and less like using trespass law. Indeed, using
TPM's is more like landowners building fences beyond their official
property lines, and deploying automatic spring guns to defend the
captured territory.' 1 5 0 As Radin's example illustrates, while self-help
plays a role in determining how producers develop their technology,
the state places limitations on technological self-help. Without these
limitations, too much self-help would lead to a Hobbesian "war of all
against all."15' Consequently, as a starting point policymakers need to
identify in stark terms the mandatory or immutable rules that society
requires for wired-in settings and default settings.1 52 If developers
know what can and cannot be a default term, they will likely respect
this guidance and develop their software accordingly. This would pre-
vent conflicts between public policy and software.
When developers rely on wired-in settings, Radin offers two rec-
ommendations on their usage. First, it is necessary to give users notice
and information about how the wired-in setting operates. 153 Second,
there should be a judicial remedy for wired-in settings. 54 Radin sug-
gests that users be allowed to challenge the setting and seek a judicial
declaration invalidating it155 This would provide a way for users to
challenge a wired-in setting on the grounds of public policy.
Once policymakers have decided a potential wired-in setting is
legitimate, the next question is whether it is practical.15 6 Sunstein
provides us with four factors policymakers should consider when
choosing between a default setting and a wired-in setting. The first is
whether users have informed preferences. 57 If they know little about
the setting, they are not likely to change it, and vice versa. It makes
sense to include a wired-in setting over a default setting when people
know little about the setting. The second issue is whether the map-
ping of defaults in software to user preferences is transparent.158 In
the case of software, this requires an easy-to-use interface that allows
150 Id. at 27.
151 Id. at 29.
152 Radin, supra note 107, at 144.
153 Radin, supra note 146, at 33.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 See Burk, supra note 16, at 19-20 (examining the costs of DRM technologies
that are wired-in).
157 Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 28, at 1197.
158 Id. at 1198.
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users to configure the software according to their 
preferences. The
third issue focuses on how much preferences 
vary across individu-
als.1 59 If there is little or no variation in society, 
it hardly makes sense
to create a default setting as opposed to a wired-in 
setting. The final
issue is whether users value having a default setting.
1 60 This can be
determined by examining marketing materials, 
software reviews, and
comments from users. If there is little concern 
over the default set-
ting, it becomes reasonable for designers to opt 
for a wired-in setting.
A summary of these issues can be found in Figure 
2, which maps out
the issues that policymakers should consider.
FIGURE 2. ANALYSIS FOR WHETHER 
THERE SHOULD BE A
DEFAULT SErFING
Analysis far Whether There
Should Be a Default Setting
As an example, we can apply this to the cookies 
example. Should
cookies be wired in beyond the control of users 
or should we allow
159 Id.
160 Id. at 1198-99.
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users the option of a default setting? As a starting 
point, the first issue
is whether this is a waivable right. Clearly, if people 
want to reduce
their privacy, it is their right. The next issue 
then considers a whole
host of practical concerns. First, it is clear 
that some users have in-
formed preferences. There is a small but significant 
number of users
that advocate choice and control when it comes 
to privacy settings.
Second, the control over the cookies setting 
can easily be mapped to
user preferences. All that is needed is a simple 
checkbox that allows
users to decide whether they want to permit 
cookies. Third, there is a
variation of preferences among users, with some 
users seeking to pro-
tect their privacy at all costs and other users 
willing to exchange their
privacy readily for conveniences. Finally, there 
are a considerable
number of users that value having a choice, 
even though they may
choose not to exercise it. These issues are summarized 
in Figure 3.
FIGURE 3. ANALYSIS FOR WHETHER THERE 
SHOULD BE A DEFAULT
SErTING: COOKIES EXAMPLE
Analysis for Whether There
Should Be a Default Setting:
Cookies Example
practical concerns 
__.
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B. A Framework for Setting Defaults
This subpart focuses on how policymakers should set default set-
tings. The first section provides a general rule for setting defaults.
The next three sections are exceptions to this general rule. The final
section provides a number of methods for adjusting the power of a
default setting.
1. Defaults as the "Would Have Wanted Standard"
Behavioral economists have analyzed how defaults should be
set.16 1 Much of this analysis has focused on defaults associated with
law and social policy, specifically contracts, but this reasoning can be
extended to software. As we discussed earlier, behavioral economists'
starting point is the Coase theorem, which holds that a default rule
does not matter if there are no transaction costs. 1 62 This is because
the parties will bargain to a common result that is efficient. Accord-
ing to this analysis, regulators do not need to be concerned with de-
faults in software, assuming there are no transaction costs. Yet there
are always transaction costs in setting defaults. The general approach
of legal scholars in contract law is that defaults should be set to mini-
mize transaction costs. Posner argues that default rules should "econ-
omize on transaction costs by supplying standard contract terms that
the parties would otherwise have to adopt by express agreement."1 1
The idea here is that the default settings should be what the parties
would have bargained for if the costs of negotiating were sufficiently
low. This approach is known as the "would have wanted" standard
and is the general approach for setting defaults in contract law. 164
The "would have wanted" standard is a good starting point for
setting defaults in software. Let the parties decide what they want
software to accomplish, and then let the developers decide what op-
tions to build into software. In following this approach, developers
would likely follow the common sense principles of HCI in protecting
novices and enhancing efficiency.16 5 The underlying assumption in
assessing the default is that both parties are negotiating over the
default.
The "would have wanted" standard does not mean that there are
no limitations for setting defaults. To the contrary, as we point out in
161 See generally Ayres & Gertner, supra note 84 (discussing default rules in the
context of economic efficiency).
162 Coase, supra note 86, at 15.
163 RicHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 413 (6th ed. 2003)
164 Ayres & Gertner, supra note 84, at 89-90 (1989).
165 See supra notes 78-83 and accompanying text.
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the next few sections there are several situations where the "would
have wanted" standard is not the best basis for setting defaults. In
these cases, policymakers may need to intervene. Besides this inter-
vention, policymakers need to be proactive. As behavioral economists
have shown, the initial default setting has a disproportionate effect on
users because of the status quo bias, omission bias, the endowment
effect, and the legitimating effect.'66 This means that policymakers
need to ensure that the initial default settings are correct. If they are
not, it will be a much more difficult job for policymakers to later
switch the default setting to another one.
The next three sections focus on limitations to the "would have
wanted" standard. Before discussing them, we need to note a neces-
sary requirement for government intervention in software settings. A
default setting should only be actionable if it materially affects a fun-
damental societal concern. While it is not in society's interest for gov-
ernment to select the default font for a word processor, it is in
society's interest to make sure fundamental societal values are pro-
tected. To illustrate this, consider the examples we have used
throughout this Article involving desktop icons, cookies, and wireless
security. All three of these examples affect fundamental societal con-
cerns of competition, privacy, and security, respectively.
2. Problem of Information
There are situations when you would expect certain users to
change the default. If they are not changing it, then it is necessary to
examine their deference. For example, if defaults relating to accessi-
bility are not widely changed among users, this should not raise a red
flag, unless disabled users are not changing these default settings. If
the disabled are not changing them, then there could be an informa-
tional problem that is leading them to defer to the default setting. At
this point, policymakers must evaluate whether there is a problem of
information.
In considering whether parties are fully informed, policymakers
need to examine several factors. These factors were identified in our
earlier discussion of understanding defaults and include bounded ra-
tionality,16 7 cognitive biases, 168 the legitimating effect, 169 and techni-
cal sophistication. 170 All of these factors should be used by
166 See supra Part I.B.
167 See supra text accompanying notes 87-89.
168 See supra text accompanying notes 90-93.
169 See supra text accompanying notes 94-96.
170 See supra text accompanying notes 134-39.
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policymakers to assess whether users are fully informed. After all, fac-
tors such as the omission bias or endowment effect may influence peo-
ple to defer to default settings. An analytical starting point for
determining whether users are informed is the work of legal scholars.
Their analysis of consent in contracts should be useful to policymakers
in determining whether users are truly informed about defaults.' 7' As
an example, considerJudge Wright's analysis of consent in a standard
form contract.1 7 2
If users are not fully informed and capable of changing the de-
fault settings, then the default should be what the parties "would have
NOT wanted." The idea here is that this setting will force the develop-
ers to communicate and share information in order to have users
change the setting to what they "would have wanted." In contract law,
this is known as a penalty default and is used to encourage disclosure
between the parties.1 73 A classic example of a penalty default is that
courts assume a default value of zero for the quantity of a contract174
The value of zero is clearly not what the parties would have wanted,
because they were bargaining for an exchange of goods. However,
this penalty default serves to penalize the parties if they do not explic-
itly change the default.
Penalty defaults are best used in situations where parties are not
equally informed. 175 In the case of software, this can mean users who
are uninformed, misinformed, or lacking technical sophistication. In
everyday practice, this suggests that socially significant defaults should
be set to protect the less-informed party. This setting forces software
developers to inform and communicate with users when they want
users to perform advanced actions that may have adverse conse-
quences on their computers if not set properly. In addition, it encour-
ages developers to ensure that defaults can be changed with a
minimal degree of technical sophistication. As an example, some
manufacturers of wireless points already use penalty defaults. Most
(but not all) wireless access points are disabled by default. Users must
go through a setup process or to a configuration menu to enable the
access point. While this default setting is not what a consumer would
have wanted, this penalty setting allows manufacturers to help the
user properly configure the access point through a setup process.
171 See supra text accompanying notes 110-22.
172 See supra text accompanying notes 113-15.
173 Ayres & Gertner, supra note 84, at 95-107 (discussing the use of penalty
defaults).
174 Id. at 95-96.
175 Id. at 98-100.
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Another example where a penalty default is appropriate is the
setting for cookies in Web browsers. As we pointed our earlier, cook-
ies are not well understood by most people. A penalty default would
require the default be set to reject cookies. If Web browsers and Web-
sites want people to use cookies, then they would have to explain to
users what cookies are and how to turn them on. By changing this
default, policymakers can use the information-forcing function of
penalty defaults to improve the state of online privacy. We believe
that if Web browsers were forced to do this, they would quickly de-
velop an interface that would inform users about cookies and high-
light the benefits of using them. This would ensure that people
understood the privacy risks of cookies. Penalty defaults are not ap-
propriate in all circumstances, such as for settings that people readily
understand. For example, if most people understand the concept of
filters and are capable of using software-filtering technology, then a
penalty default is unwarranted. In this case, policymakers should fol-
low the "would have wanted" standard for setting defaults.
3. Externalities
A second reason for settings defaults at what the parties "would
have not wanted" is to account for externalities. Settings in software
can often affect third parties in a myriad of ways that are analogous to
increasing the risk to an innocent passerby or through pollution. In
these situations, policymakers should consider the overall welfare of
users and intervene to ensure a default value is set to reduce externali-
ties. However, if the problem is grave enough, it may be necessary to
change the setting from a default value to a wired-in setting. In effect,
this recommendation echoes HICI guidance by setting the default to
what is most efficient for society. 176
An example of where software defaults create high externalities is
wireless security. Most manufacturers would prefer not to enable all
wireless security functions, mainly because it leads to reduced func-
tionality and increased support costs. Most users know very little
about wireless security issues and cannot adequately bargain for their
inclusion. This inaction costs everyone when wireless security is com-
promised. These costs could be reduced if security features, such as
encryption, were enabled by default.
The core finding for wireless security can be applied to security in
software. Default settings for all software should be generally set to
enable security. Unfortunately, developers are still selling products
176 See supra text accompanying notes 78-83.
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that have defaults set to insecure values. The most egregious exam-
ples are internet-enabled products that rely on default passwords,
such as the Axis camera used at Livingstone Middle School as dis-
cussed in the introduction.177 Policymakers should force these devel-
opers to change their default password function to improve security
and societal welfare.
4. Compliance with the Law
There are occasional circumstances when policymakers need to
set defaults to comply with laws, regulations, or established legal prin-
ciples. While these circumstances often involve issues with externali-
ties or lack of information for users, they do not necessarily have these
issues. They may be protecting values we hold as immutable.178 For
example, government may mandate default settings under the guise
of paternalism. The Children's Online Privacy Protection Act sets a
default rule that websites cannot collect information from children. 79
Websites can switch from this default setting only if they have ob-
tained parental consent.1 8 0 This example illustrates how policymakers
may need to defer to existing laws in setting defaults.
The first example of software defaults we discussed involved
Microsoft and Compaq sparring over the default icons on the desktop.
How should a policymaker set the default in this situation? This ques-
tion is a difficult one that the courts considered during Microsoft's
antitrust trial. The district court and court of appeals held that
Microsoft's restrictions on default icons were anticompetitive because
they raised the cost for manufacturers to add additional software and
therefore protected Microsoft's monopoly. 8 1 At this point forward,
policymakers now have guidance for how these software defaults
should be set. It is more difficult to argue retrospectively that policy-
makers in 1995 should have intervened and set these defaults. Never-
theless, this example shows how policymakers may need to set defaults
to comport with existing law and policy.
177 See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
178 See supra text accompanying notes 104-09.
179 Children's Online Privacy Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506 (2000). For
general background, see EPIC's Children's Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA)
website at http://www.epic.org/privacy/kids/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2006).
180 15 U.S.C. §§ 6502(b) (2000).
181 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 39 (D.D.C. 2000), affd in
part, rev'd in part, 253 F.3d 34, 64-67 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see David McGowan, Between
Logic and Experience: Error Costs and United States v. Microsoft Corp,, 20 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1185, 1231-36 (2005) (reviewing the issue of default icons in the Microsoft
antitrust trial).
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5. Applications of the Framework
This section illustrates the decision-making process for switching
an existing default setting. A flowchart for the process can be found
in Figure 4. To illustrate this process, we provide flowcharts for two
examples: wireless security and cookies.
FIGuRE 4. DECISION PROCESS FOR SWITCHING AN EXISTING
DEFAULT SETTING
Decision Process for Switching an
Existing Default Setting
Problem of Information Compliance with the welfM
Law
Externalities
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FiGURE 5. WIRELESS SECURITY EXAMPLE
Decision Process for Switching an
Existing Default Setting
iswirelss saecurity a No No need to switch
fundamental ace~ the default setnconcern?
YYes
Are peopte not No ------- &
ing default s
w i n rate D o s t e N o
or drefal afecrty
defaultt to Woti
w i eiee 
les secu rity
Externaliies
In Figure 5, the decision process is applied to the wireless 
security
example. The first decision fo  wirele s security is wheth r 
it affects a
fundamental societal concern. Security is universally 
considered a sig-
nific nt issue. The next step is to consider whether
any of the three
criteria apply for intervening and switching a default 
setting. The first
is whether people are not changing defaults that 
they should. Re-
search shows that people are deferring to existing 
default settings
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without truly consenting. This suggests that policymakers should in-
tervene and switch the defaults settings, in effect utilizing penalty de-
faults. As we discussed above, penalty defaults provide an
information-forcing function that can improve the state of security.1 2
Another alternative is to increase default switching through education
or an improved user interface. The second criterion does not apply
here, because there is no issue regarding compliance with the law.
The third issue of externalities is important. As we discussed in the
section on externalities, wireless security imposes costs on third par-
ties.183 Consequently, policymakers need to either change the default
setting or ensure that more people will switch the default, e.g., by edu-
cating users.
In Figure 6, the decision process is applied to the cookies exam-
ple. The first issue is the threshold issue and asks whether cookies
affect a fundamental societal concern. The issue of online privacy is
fundamental and is manifested in debates over cookies in the policy
community. The first criterion for switching an existing default set-
ting is whether people are not changing defaults that they should. As
we discussed earlier in the problem of information section, cookies
are not well understood by people. 8 4 Consequently, one way of reme-
dying this is by using penalty defaults that would entail switching the
default to "off' for cookies. The second criterion is compliance with
the law. This issue depends upon the user. Federal agencies have
restrictions on using cookies.18 5 While there have been lawsuits
against the use of cookies, courts have not found cookies illegal or
deceptive.' 86 For now, this criterion does not push for changing de-
fault settings for cookies. Finally, the last criterion does not apply,
because the collection of cookies data does not affect third parties.
182 See supra Part lI1.B.2.
183 See supra Part lII.B.3.
184 See supra Part lIL.B.2.
185 Memorandum from Jacob J. Lew, Director, Office of Mgmt. and Budget, to
Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, Privacy Policies and Data Collection
on Federal Web Sites 2 (June 22, 2000), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
OMB/memoranda/mOO-13.html.
186 Dan Richman, Online Privacy Gets Safeguard, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Aug.
27, 2002, at El.
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FIGURE 6. COOKIES EXAMPLE
Decision Process for Switching an
Existing Default Setting
Problem of Information Compliance with the
Law
Externalities
6. Adjusting the Power of a Default
In general, more default settings are better, because they allow
users to reconfigure and use their software as they see fit. However,
there are limitations to this rule that are recognized within HCI's user
customization research.18 7 First, the more defaults that are present,
187 See supra text accompanying notes 75-77.
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the more likely users will be confused and intimidated by the number
of choices. Second, there are practical limits to how many default set-
tings designers can present in a useful manner without overloading
the user interface. As designers add more functions that users can
modify, the software will reach a point of diminishing returns where
users are overwhelmed and confused. In effect, this places a practical
limit on how many default options should be available to users.
The power of a default setting can be modified in two ways. The
first is through changes in the user interface. For example, increasing
(or reducing) the prominence of a default setting in the user inter-
face can affect its use. Second, procedural constraints can make it
more costly to change a default setting. These procedural constraints
could ensure users are acting voluntarily and are fully informed
before they change a default setting. A simple example is an extra
prompt that asks users whether they are really sure they want to
change the default setting. A more extensive example is changing the
settings for an air bag. To install an air bag on-off switch, the con-
sumer must send a request form to NHTSA and then bring the
NHTSA authorization letter to a dealership to have a switch in-
stalled. 188 These procedural constraints attempt to address the prob-
lem of bounded rationality and bounded self-control. While a wide
range of possible procedural constraints exist, they all serve to raise
the cost of switching the default setting.
If modifications to the user interface and procedural constraints
are not enough, then the situation may require a wired-in setting ver-
sus a default setting. 89 There are a variety of reasons, including safety
and various externalities (e.g., radio interference, network conges-
tion, or security), why users should not be able to change a setting. In
these situations, a policymaker may seek a wired-in setting; however,
this is a serious decision, because it limits the user's control.
IV. SHAPING DEFAULTS THROUGH GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION
Unlike in contract law, there appears to be very little role for the
judicial system or government in enforcing defaults. This does not
mean that the judicial system or government is powerless over de-
faults. Instead, there are a number of actions government can take to
influence default settings in software. In general, there are two ap-
proaches for government intervention into defaults settings. This Part
begins by discussing government forcing developers to offer a default
setting versus government mandating a certain default setting. The
188 Make Inoperative Exemptions, 49 C.F.R. § 595.5(b) (1) (2005).
189 See supra Part III.A.
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rest of this Part focuses on methods the government 
can use to affect
default settings, such as regulation.
The first method government could use is mandating 
developers
to incorporate certain features into software. 
These features could be
wired-in or default settings, but the emphasis here 
is changing the
software to include these features. A simple 
example in automobile
manufacturing is how the government mandated 
seat belts in automo-
biles.190 The government is not focused on the default 
setting for seat
belt use; instead it just wants to ensure that occupants have a 
choice.
The second method available to the government 
is for it to favor
a certain default setting. In some cases, the government 
has to pick a
default option, because there has to be a choice 
if an individual does
not make any decision. A good example here 
is government's policy
on organ donation. Government has to choose 
a default position, ei-
ther a person is presumed to have consented to 
organ donation or a
person must explicitly consent to donation.
191 In other cases, the gov-
ernment chooses a default value to advance societal 
welfare. For ex-
ample, the warranty of merchantability is a default 
rule that parties
can waive. 192
A. Technology Forcing Regulation
The typical approach for government to promote 
social welfare is
to rely on technology forcing regulation to ensure 
certain features are
incorporated into communication technologies.
193 For example, the
government mandated closed-captioning technology 
into televisions
to aid people who are deaf.
194 Similarly, the government mandated
the incorporation of the V-chip to assist parents 
in blocking inappro-
priate television content) 95 In both these examples, 
the govern-
190 See ROBERT W. CRANDALL ET AL., REGULATING 
THE AUTOMOBILE 155-56 (1986)
(discussing government-mandated safety improvement for 
automobiles).
191 Johnson & Goldstein, supra note 35, at 1338.
192 Ayres & Gertner, supra note 84, at 87.
193 See Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah, Shaping Code, 18 HARV. 
J.L. & TECH. 319,
363-70 (2005) (providing an overview of technology forcing 
regulation for software).
194 The incorporation of closed captioning technology 
was similar to the incorpo-
ration of the ultrahigh frequency (UHF) tuner. Before government 
regulation, con-
sumers were forced to buy an expensive stand-alone 
decoder. See generally Sy DuBow,
The Television Decoder Circuitry Act-TVfor All, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 
609, 610-11, 615-16
(1991) (providing a history of legislative process to require 
manufacturers to incorpo-
rate closed captioning).
195 The V-chip was a relatively simple technology 
based on the modification of the
closed captioning technology. See Kristen S. 
Burns, Legislative Update, Protecting the
Child: The V-Chip Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 
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ment's goal is to ensure users have an option. They are not requiring
manufacturers to set a certain default setting.
In other instances, technology forcing regulation can also require
certain default settings. The anti-spain legislation known as CAN-
SPAM had a default setting of opt-out for commercial electronic mail
messages. 196 A sender has to provide a mechanism in each message to
allow recipients to refuse additional messages. This policy is different
from the one adopted by the European Union, which requires an opt-
in process. In the European Union a recipient must have given prior
consent before they can be sent an email message.' 9 7 Similarly, the
United States government's National Do Not Call Registry provides
people with a choice to receive telemarketing calls.' 98 The default is
that people will accept telemarketing calls. If they do not wish to re-
ceive these calls, they need to register their phone number with the
registry. 1 99
Another example of technology forcing regulation affecting de-
fault settings is the Children's Internet Protection Act (CIPA). 20o The
Supreme Court decision on CIPA focused on the disabling of filters
for adult access.201 The ability to disable the filters was an important
element to ensure the law was not overly restrictive. The general con-
sensus by librarians is that to comply with the law, they need to set up
computers where the filter is on by default, but adult patrons can dis-
able the filter.20 2
& ENT. L. & POL'Y 143, 145-46 (1996); Lisa D. Cornacchia, Note, The V-Chip: A Little
Thing but a Big Deal, 25 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 385, 391-92 (2001).
196 Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of
2003 (CAN-SPAM Act) § 2, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7701-7713 (Supp. III 2003).
197 See FRANCoISE BECKER, CAN-SPAM AND THE EU DIRECTIVE 1 (2003), available at
http://www.Isoft.com/news/optin2003/canspamvseu.pdf (providing an overview of
the differences between the U.S. and European approach towards unsolicited "junk"
email).
198 "Do-Not Call" Provisions of Telemarketing Sales Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. 66,124,
66,124 to 66,126 (Nov. 24, 1999) (codified at 16 C.F.R. §310.4 (2006)) (announce-
ment of public forum).
199 Id.
200 Children's Internet Protection Act (CIPA), Pub. L. No. 106-554, §§ 1701-1741,
114 Stat. 2763, 2763A-335 to 2763A-352 (2000) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 9134 (2000 &
Supp. I1 2003); 47 U.S.C. § 254 (2000 & Supp. Il1 2003)).
201 United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 203-09 (2003) (noting the
ability of library patrons to have software filtering disabled).
202 See Robert Bocher & Mary Minow, CIPA: Key Issues for Decision Makers, WEBJuNc-
TION, Aug. 31, 2003, http://webjunction.org/do/DisplayContent?id=990 (offering a
summary of issues associated with CIPA, including filter disabling, the use of com-
puters by patrons, and definitions of key legal terms); Thomas M. Susman, Questions
and Answers on Filter Disabling Under CIPA, AM. LIBRARY ASS'N, Dec. 3, 2003, http://
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B. Other Means for Shaping Software
The government has several means at its disposal to influence de-
fault settings besides regulation. The first is a market-based approach,
which uses market incentives as either a stick or a carrot.20 3 In the
stick approach, the government relies on its tax policy to penalize cer-
tain software settings.20 4 An exemplar of how the government uses tax
policy to penalize certain sales is the gas-guzzler tax, which penalizes
the sale of inefficient automobiles. 20 5 A similar policy could be used
to penalize software that does not meet a certain criterion, such as
basic security or accessibility features. This would encourage develop-
ers to develop software differently. The problem with this approach is
enforcement. Many software programs are not sold, such as open
source software, or are bought from other countries. A better ap-
proach may be for the government to rely on tax expenditures.
Tax expenditures operate by reducing a firm's tax burden to cre-
ate an incentive for developing certain software. 20 6 For example, gov-
ernment could give a tax break to software developers whose software
is highly secure or incorporates accessibility features. Enforcement is
much easier in this case, because firms have an incentive to prove to
the government that they are complying with the requirements of the
tax expenditure. This carrot approach is likely to be much more suc-
cessful at pushing developers to include certain features or defaults in
software.
A second approach the government can use to influence default
settings is the implementation of information-forcing measures. This
strategy could include requiring software developers to disclose infor-
mation about their products to the public.20 7 Software developers
could be forced to disclose certain security or privacy features to con-
sumers. This would increase consumer awareness that there are cer-
www.ala.org/ala/washoff/WOissues/civilliberties/cipaweb/adviceresources/scena-
rios.htm (providing examples of this policy of filtering by default).
203 See Kesan & Shah, supra note 193, at 342-51 (discussing market-based ap-
proaches for shaping software).
204 Id. at 343-46. See generally Eric M. Zolt, Deterrence Via Taxation: A Critical Analysis
of Tax Penalty Provisions, 37 UCLA L. REv. 343 (1989) (discussing the use of tax
penalties).
205 Gas Guzzler Tax, 26 U.S.C.A. § 4064 (West 2000 & Supp. 2006).
206 See Kesan & Shah, supra note 193, at 380-84 (discussing the use of tax expendi-
tures for shaping software). See generally, STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. McDANIEL, TAx
EXPENDITURES (1985) (providing the authoritative work on tax expenditures).
207 See Kesan & Shah, supra note 193, at 361-63 (discussing the role of disclosure
for shaping software); see also STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 161-64
(1982) (discussing disclosure as a means of regulation).
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tain settings incorporated into the software, An example of disclosure
requirements is within the Children's Online Privacy Protection
Act,20 8 which sets a default rule that Websites cannot collect informa-
tion from children. 20 9 Websites can switch from this default setting,
only if they have obtained parental consent. Instead of forcing disclo-
sure, the government could spend its resources educating people
about settings in software. For example, the FCC set up a consumer
education initiative for digital television,210 and the SEC has launched
educational campaigns to warn investors of scam Websites.2 11
A third approach relies on government's procurement power to
favor software with preferred default settings.2 12 For example, govern-
ment has set procurement requirements favoring energy efficient
computers.2 13 The same set of requirements could be set for software
in areas such as security, privacy, or accessibility. Similarly, the gov-
ernment could favor certain default rules by ensuring the government
purchases technology with those default rules. This method strives to
stimulate demand for a certain set of technologies. 21 4 The govern-
ment could create a market for technologies that are secure by de-
fault. For example, it would only purchase technology that does not
use default passwords.
208 Children's Online Privacy Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506 (2000).
209 Id. § 6502(b). Similarly, the FCC has a rule that "prohibit[s] interactivity dur-
ing children's programming that connects viewers to commercial matter unless par-
ents 'opt in' to such services." Children's Television Obligations of Digital Television
Broadcasters, 19 F.C.C.R. 22,945, 22,968 (2004).
210 See Digital Television (DTV) Tomorrow's TV Today!, http://www.dtv.gov/ (last vis-
ited Oct. 6, 2006) (providing the public with information about digital television).
211 Press Release, SEC, Regulators Launch Fake Scam Websites To Warn Investors
About Fraud (Jan. 30, 2002), http://www.sec.gov/news/headlines/scamsites.htm.
212 See Kesan & Shah, supra note 193, at 371-79 (discussing procurement as an
effective method by government to influence software). See generally C. Edquist & L.
Hommen, Public Technology Procurement and Innovation Theory, in PUBLIC TECHNOLOGY
PROCUREMENT AND INNOVATION 5, 20-27 (Charles Edquist et al. eds., 2000) (discuss-
ing the opportunity that governments have to pursue policy goals by making specific
demands when procuring new technology).
213 Exec. Order No. 11,912, 41 Fed. Reg. 15,825, 15,825 to 15,826 (Apr. 13, 1976)
(calling for several measures to improve energy efficiency of equipment government
purchases).
214 See generally Jennifer McCadney, The Green Society? Leveraging the Government's
Buying Powers to Create Markets for Recycled Products, 29 PuB. CONT. L.j 135 (1999) (dis-
cussing the government's procurement power in the context of environmental
concerns).
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CONCLUSION
Defaults in software are powerful, because for a variety of reasons,
people defer to them. This has implications for specific societal is-
sues, such as wireless security, but it may also affect our social norms
and culture. After all, the notion of open and free Wi-Fi is in part
attributable to the default value of no encryption. Consequently, de-
faults are important not only for policymakers, but also for those seek-
ing to understand the impact of technology upon culture.
This Article provides several examples of how defaults can influ-
ence behavior. Defaults are powerful not only because so many peo-
ple rely on them rather than choose an alternative, but also because
there is little understanding of software defaults. We considered how
the disciplines of computer science, behavioral economics, legal
scholarship, and communications theorize defaults. While we found
limitations in all these disciplinary approaches, we also found useful
insights for understanding why people defer to software defaults. To
illustrate these insights, we applied all four approaches to several con-
crete examples dealing with issues of competition, privacy, and
security.
This led us to provide recommendations for how defaults should
be set. As a threshold matter, we set forth a methodology for deciding
whether we should use a default setting or a wired-in setting in a par-
ticular situation. We argue, in general, that policymakers should not
intervene in default settings and that developers should rely on the
"would have wanted" standard.21 5 This standard ensures that the
wishes of both parties are met in the design of defaults. However,
there are three circumstances where policymakers may need to inter-
vene and challenge the settings agreed to by users and developers.
These are all highlighted on the flowcharts for the decisionmaking
process. The first circumstance typically arises when users lack the
knowledge and ability to change an important default setting. In
these cases, policymakers ought to use penalty defaults to shift the
burden of the default to the developer. This penalty default setting
serves as an information-forcing function to educate users while users
are changing the default settings.
One scenario for the government to implement a penalty default
is one involving privacy issues. Setting a penalty default to protect a
user's information forces developers to notify and educate users
before they have to share their personal information. While this ap-
proach is paternalistic, it still provides users with the freedom to
215 See supra Part III.B.1.
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choose as they wish. We suggest that in these rare situations when
there is a fundamental societal concern at stake and people are unin-
formed, misinformed, or not technically sophisticated enough to
change the default, then, as a matter of public policy, people should
be protected. If people want to give up that protection, then we
should support well-informed individuals to make that decision. How-
ever, the default should be set to protect individuals.
The second circumstance where policymakers need to intervene
involves default settings that cause harm to third parties. These exter-
nalities may need to be addressed by changing a default value. A
good example of this is system security. While it is in the interest of
users and developers to make systems very open to other users, this
can have a negative externality because of costs from network conges-
tion and spam. In this situation, policymakers have an interest in en-
suring a default is either set to reduce externalities or to insist that the
default be replaced with a "wired-in" setting to limit externalities.
The final circumstance in which policymakers need to intervene
is when a default setting does not comport with existing law and pol-
icy. In these situations, it is necessary for policymakers to ensure the
default setting is changed. Examples of this are defaults relating to
competition and antitrust. Policyrnakers may need to ensure that a
monopolist does not use defaults in an anticompetitive fashion.
Besides these recommendations, we also noted a number of
other considerations policymakers need to take into account. First,
biases such as the endowment effect and the legitimating effect can
make changing the initial default very costly. This means policymak-
ers need to carefully consider the initial default setting. Second, a
concerted effort needs to be undertaken to identify the defaults
software can and cannot have. Arguably, there are some values that
software developers cannot allow users to waive.
The final part of the Article focused on steps government can
take in shaping defaults. This part was not meant as an exhaustive list
of measures government can take, but as a way to show that govern-
ment is not powerless in dealing with software defaults. Government
has a long history of regulating software and influencing software de-
faults. Besides regulation, government has a variety of other ap-
proaches available. These approaches include fiscal measures, such as
its power of taxation and procurement power, as well as trying to en-
sure that users are informed about software defaults.
This Article's normative analysis regarding software settings is
unique. While many scholars have recognized the power of software,
our approach is unique in terms of arguing from a generalized frame-
work how default settings in software should be determined. We be-
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lieve that as scholars further investigate and understand the impact of
software on social welfare, they will conduct normative analyses for
other software characteristics, such as standards, modularity, and the
like. Indeed, today policymakers have little guidance for analyzing
other governance characteristics of software, such as transparency and
standards. Our hope is that this Article provides a step toward influ-
encing software to enhance social welfare.
